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INTRODUCTION

n keeping with the trend seen in recent years, the Texas Supreme
Court continues to expand the traditional standards for mandamus
relief. For example, citing "judicial economy," the Supreme Court
reviewed an order denying a motion for continuance after expressly finding that it had no mandamus jurisdiction over the order.1 The Supreme
Court also dispensed with the traditional requirement in mandamus proceedings that the relator show it has no adequate remedy at law when a
visiting judge refuses to disqualify himself after proper objection.2 The
Court further refused to foreclose the possibility of mandamus review of
procedural irregularities committed by courts of appeals in interlocutory
1. General Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. 1997) (orig.
proceeding).
2. See Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. 1997) (orig.
proceeding); Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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appeals. 3 In addition, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the appealability of interlocutory class certification orders that "alter[ ] the fundamental
nature of the class," and defined the scope of appellate jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders denying summary judgment based on an assertion of
immunity. 4 Reaffirming the vitality of its holding in State Department of
Highways and Public Transportation v. Payne,5 the Supreme Court refused to find waiver in a party's failure to strictly comply with the rules
for objecting to the charge when the party's oral objection and written
'6
request "left no room for misunderstanding of its complaint."
With respect to the appellate timetable, the Texas Supreme Court clarified that the period for perfecting appeal is extended by filing a timely
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law when the judgment is
based in whole or in part on an evidentiary hearing. 7 Extending its holding in Jamar v. Patterson,8 the Court further held that a motion for new
trial timely presented without the required filing fee extends the appellate timetable when the fee is paid after the motion is overruled by operation of law. 9 However, this must occur before the trial court loses plenary
jurisdiction. 10
The Court continues to require liberal construction of the rules of appellate procedure, condemning at least one court of appeals for affirming
the trial court's judgment on the basis of items omitted from the record
after having summarily denied a pre-submission request to supplement
the record." In fact, in one case, instead of requiring the appellant to
carry its burden of presenting a sufficient record on appeal to show reversible error, the Supreme Court recognized its "residual authority to
complete the record to assure that justice is done.' 2 Consequently, the
Court directed a trial court to transmit to the clerk of the Supreme Court
a transcript that was never made a part of the appellate court record. 13
Also during the Survey period, the Supreme Court reemphasized its
holding in Mafrige v. Ross,' 4 that a summary judgment appearing final on
its face is final for purposes of appeal, even if it grants more relief than
3. See Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 951 S.W.2d 394
(Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.
1997) (orig. proceeding).
4. See De Los Santos v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 933 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam); Newman v. Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1997).
5. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
6. Galveston County Fair & Rodeo, Inc. v. Glover, 940 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam).
7. See IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1997). See
also Awde v. Dabeit, 938 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam); Phillips v. Beavers, 938
S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
8. 868 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
9. See Tate v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 934 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam).
10. See id.
11. See Gallagher v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 950 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
12. Feldman v. Marks, 960 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
13. See id.
14. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
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requested. 15 The Court further clarified that, on appeal, those portions of
16
the judgment granting more relief than requested should be reversed.
II.

APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A.

MANDAMUS

1. Orders: "ExtraordinaryCircumstances" Establishing No Adequate
Remedy by Appeal
a.

Preservation of Consulting-Expert Privilege

Extraordinary circumstances justifying the exercise of mandamus jurisdiction exist when a party can obtain meaningful appellate review of a
trial court's order only by first disobeying the order. 17 In GeneralMotors
Corp. v. Gayle,18 the district court entered an order requiring General
Motors (GM) to notify the plaintiffs of any crash tests conducted for evidentiary, rather than consulting, purposes. 19 This crash test order effectively required GM to determine in20 advance whether each test was for
evidentiary or consulting purposes.
GM sought a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, challenging the
crash test order (among other things). 2 1 The court of appeals denied the
22
requested relief, finding that GM had an adequate remedy by appeal.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. The Court found that the district
court's crash test order violated the consulting-expert privilege and held
GM had no adequate remedy by appeal. 23 The Court reasoned, to obtain
meaningful appellate review of the crash test order without violating its
consulting-expert privilege, GM would have to fail to notify the plaintiffs
of the tests and nonetheless attempt to use the results of these tests at
trial, subjecting it to potential contempt proceedings. 24 Because a party
should never have to disobey a court order to obtain meaningful review
in the court of appeals, the Court conditionally granted mandamus relief
on the crash test order and held that GM lacked an adequate remedy by
25
appeal.
b.

Judicial Economy

As a general rule, the Supreme Court will not grant mandamus relief to
15. See Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
16. See Bandera Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1997) (per
curiam); Page v. Geller, 941 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
17. See General Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. 1997) (orig.
proceeding).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 472.
20. See id. at 473.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 474, 476.
24. See id. at 476.
25. See id.
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revise a trial court's erroneous scheduling order "however perverse. '2 6
The Court, however, will remedy such an error in the interest of judicial
economy if it finds another aspect of the trial court's actions constitutes
"special circumstances" justifying mandamus relief.2 7 In GeneralMotors,
the Supreme Court conditionally granted GM's petition for writ of mandamus regarding a discovery order. 28 GM also sought mandamus review
of the trial court's denial of a motion for continuance, but the Supreme
Court found it did not give rise to extraordinary circumstances justifying
the exercise of the Court's mandamus jurisdiction. 29 Nonetheless, in the
interest of judicial economy, the Court reviewed the denial of the motion
30
for continuance.
The Court concluded that the denial of a motion for continuance,
sought in part to provide GM with sufficient time to pay its jury fee, was
an abuse of discretion when the trial court had no expectation of reaching
the merits of the trial for weeks. 31 Accordingly, the Court directed the
trial court to abort the nonjury trial and place the case on the jury
docket. 32 As the Supreme Court had already noted its lack of jurisdiction
over this issue, however, the authority for the Court's action is unclear.
c.

Discovery

Discovery abuses continue to merit mandamus relief by the Texas
Supreme Court. Citing DillardDepartment Stores, Inc. v. HalP3 and Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson,34 the Supreme Court held that a party ordered to
respond to an overly broad or vague discovery request has no adequate
remedy at law and is, therefore, entitled to mandamus relief. 35
In K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson,36 the plaintiff sued K Mart (among
others) for failing to take adequate safety precautions to prevent her abduction from a K Mart parking lot and her resulting rape. 37 The plaintiff
served interrogatories on K Mart asking it to describe any criminal activity that had occurred on its property both locally and nationally for the
past seven years. 38 Plaintiff also asked K Mart to list any other incidences
of abduction or rape in any store nationwide. 39 The trial court ordered K
40
Mart to respond.
26. Id. at 477.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
34. 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
35. See K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 430.
38. See id. at 431.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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The Supreme Court found the interrogatories overly broad because
they asked K Mart to describe all criminal conduct that had occurred on
its premises, even though many criminal activities occurring on the premises, such as shoplifting, were irrelevant to the issue of whether K Mart's
parking lots were safe.41 Conditionally granting writ, the Court found the
request for information regarding criminal activities at stores throughout
the state and nation overly broad because conduct in other cities at other
K Mart's, especially those in other states, is too remote to justify
discovery. 42
d.

Extraordinary Discovery Sanctions

In Ford Motor Co. v. Tyson, 43 the Dallas Court of Appeals granted
mandamus relief to Ford Motor Company from the trial court's order
imposing a ten million dollar discovery sanction, which was to be paid in
ten days to avoid contempt orders. 44 The court urged, however, that it
was not the amount of the sanction that led the court to grant relief to the
relator; rather, mandamus relief was appropriate to prohibit the imposition of an arbitrary fine that was not authorized by Texas Rule of Civil
to enter the
Procedure 215(3). 45 Because the trial court had no power
46
sanction order, the court reasoned, mandamus would lie.
e.

Affidavit of Inability to Pay

In Reed v. Onion,47 the San Antonio Court of Appeals exercised mandamus jurisdiction when a county court applied the wrong rule of civil
48
procedure in denying an appellant's affidavit of inability to pay costs.
In Reed, a party filed an Affidavit of Inability to Give Appeal Bond in the
county court, seeking to appeal a judgment in the justice court.49 The
county court denied appellant's affidavit because it failed to comply with
the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. 50 Noting that
Rule 145 applies to original proceedings while Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 57251 governs an appellant's failure to pay costs on appeal from a
41. See id. The Supreme Court did find, however, that a request that K Mart produce
all documents "which relate to, touch or concern the allegations of this lawsuit" was not
unduly broad or burdensome because the request was limited to the specific lawsuit. Id. at
430-431.
42. See id. at 431.
43. 943 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, orig. proceeding).
44. See id. at 529.
45. See id. at 532. Rule 215(3) permits a trial court to impose "appropriate" sanctions
authorized under the Rules of Civil Procedure against a party that has abused the discovery process. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(3).
46. See Ford, 943 S.W.2d at 532.
47. 937 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding).
48. See id. at 610.
49. See id.
50. See id. Rule 145 provides in relevant part, "The affidavit shall contain the following statements: 'I am unable to pay the court costs. I verify that the statements made in the
affidavit are true and correct.' The affidavit shall be sworn before a Notary Public." TEX.
R. Civ. P. 145(2).
51. Rule 572 provides in relevant part:
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justice court 52 the court of appeals conditionally granted mandamus to
correct the trial court's abuse of discretion in applying the wrong rule.
f. Disqualification of Counsel
In Schwartz v. Jefferson,53 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals
54
conditionally granted mandamus on an order disqualifying counsel.
The court noted that the relator, who was the defendant in the underlying
lawsuit, could not remedy on appeal a court's order that required her to
go to trial without her counsel of choice.5 5 The court also found that the
district court abused its discretion by dismissing the defendant's counsel
because he did not intend to testify at trial and the plaintiff's counsel
56
could not show any prejudice to the continued representation.
g. Denial of Severance Motion
Despite evidence that all parties had agreed to a severance and the
district court had agreed to reconsider its original motion denying the
severance, the First District Court of Appeals in Black v. Smith57 stayed
proceedings in the trial court and found extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify exercising its mandamus jurisdiction. 58 Finding that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for severance, the
court of appeals conditionally granted writ directing the district court to
59
grant the motion and sever the cases.
h. Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration
In EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias,60 the Supreme Court exercised its mandamus jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement under the Federal
Arbitration Act. 6 1 The Court held that "[w]hen a trial court erroneously
denies a party the right to arbitration under the FAA, it has no adequate
'62
remedy at law."
Where appellant is unable to pay the costs of appeal, or give security therefor, he shall nevertheless be entitled to appeal by making strict proof of such
inability . . ., which shall consist of his affidavit filed with the justice of the
peace stating his inability to pay such costs, or any part thereof, or to give
security.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 572.
52. See Reed, 937 S.W.2d at 610.
53. 930 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding).
54. See id. at 962.
55. See id. at 959.
56. See id. at 961.
57. 956 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, orig. proceeding).

58. See id. at 73.
59. See id. at 75.
60. 934 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
61. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
62. EZ Pawn, 934 S.W.2d at 91.
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Orders: No Evidence of Adequate Remedy by Appeal Required

2.

In a series of cases where the trial court exceeded its jurisdictional authority, the Supreme Court granted mandamus relief without requiring
the petitioner to first show that he had no adequate remedy by appeal.
a.

State Bar Proceedings

In State Bar of Texas v. Jefferson,63 the Supreme Court conditionally
granted writs of mandamus and prohibition to prohibit a trial court from
enjoining the continuation of state bar disciplinary proceedings. 64 In Jefferson, the district court issued a temporary restraining order staying proceedings before a disciplinary committee investigatory panel after two
lawyers complained of irregularities in the proceedings. 65 Notably, these
same two lawyers filed for mandamus relief in the Supreme Court on the
66
same claims raised in the injunction proceedings before the trial court.
The Court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin state bar
disciplinary proceedings because the lawyers had other more direct
means of complaining about the proceedings. 67 Holding that an original
proceeding is the appropriate remedy when a trial court issues an order
beyond its jurisdiction, the Court conditionally granted mandamus and
prohibition. The Court directed the trial court to vacate the temporary
restraining order and avoid any further interference with the state bar
68
disciplinary proceedings.
b.

Visiting Judges

Mandamus is also the appropriate remedy when a visiting judge refuses
to disqualify himself after a proper objection is made under section
74.053 of the Texas Government Code.6 9 Any order made by a judge
after proper objection is void and the objecting party may seek70 mandamus relief without showing he has no adequate remedy at law.
In Flores v. Banner,7 1 Flores filed an objection on the day of the hear63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

942 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
See id. at 576.
See id. at 575.
See id.
See id. at 576.
See id.
Section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code provides in relevant part:
(b) If a party to a civil case files a timely objection to the assignment the
judge shall not hear the case. Except as provided by subsection (d), each
party to the case is only entitled to one objection under this section for that
case.

(d) A former judge or justice who was not a retired judge may not sit in a
case if either party objects to the judge or justice.
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) & (d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
70. See Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex. 1997) (orig.
proceeding); Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
71. 932 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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ing to the appointment of a former judge to hear her motion to recuse the
presiding judge. 72 The former judge overruled the objection. 73 Citing
section 74.053(b) and (d), the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the former judge to disqualify himself from any further proceedings in the matter, reasoning that disqualification under the
Government Code is mandatory after proper objection is made. 74
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion on identical legal issues in Dunn v. Street.75 After sustaining Dunn's objection to a visiting
judge, the visiting judge nonetheless ordered Dunn to appear and show
cause why he should not be in contempt for failing to appear at a hearing.76 Citing Flores, the Supreme Court held that mandamus is appropriate where a visiting judge proceeds to enter a show cause order after
sustaining an objection to his participation. 77
In Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth,78 the Texas Supreme Court was
faced with the additional determination of whether the objecting party
raised a proper objection to the visiting judge. In Mitchell, the plaintiff
exercised its one objection under section 74.053 of the Texas Government
Code and then objected to a retired judge subsequently assigned to the
case. 79 Under the Government Code, a party is ordinarily permitted only
one objection to a retired judge, but may make additional objections to
visiting judges that are not retired judges. 80 Granting mandamus relief
and enforcing the objection to the subsequently assigned retired judge,
the Supreme Court held that section 74.053 of the Government Code
only limits the number of objections a party can make to retired judges
whose retired status vested at the time the judge left office. 81 Thus, a
party can exercise an unlimited number of objections to a retired judge
who gained retired status through serving as a visiting judge rather than
through serving as an elected judge. 82
3.

Orders: Circumstances Not WarrantingMandamus Relief
a.

Adequate Remedy by Appeal

As seen in Jefferson, a party has an adequate remedy by appeal from a
trial court's order temporarily sealing all filed paperwork. 83 The party
may still obtain the relief it seeks from the trial court and may appeal the
issue. 84
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 501.
See id. at 500.
See id. at 501-02.
938 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
See id. at 34.
See id. at 35.
943 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding).
See id. at 437.
See id.
See id. at 440-41.
See id.
See Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d at 576.
See id.
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Although the court in Ford Motor Co. v. Tyson 85 granted mandamus
relief on the issue of monetary sanctions, it held that excluding evidence
as a discovery sanction is not a "death penalty sanction" requiring immediate mandamus review by the court of appeals. 86 Where the evidence
remains in the possession of the party sanctioned and nothing in the sanction order precludes the party from making an adequate appeal record,
the party has an adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus will not
87
issue.
Similarly, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the imposition of the
payment of attorneys' fees as a sanction is88not the type of extraordinary
circumstances justifying mandamus relief.
b.

Premature Petition for Mandamus

Under some circumstances, the Texas Supreme Court will deny mandamus relief as premature to allow the trial court the opportunity to reconsider its decision. In GeneralMotors,8 9 GM paid a jury fee on the date of
the trial setting and then moved for a continuance to conduct additional
discovery and to allow the jury fee to become timely. 90 The trial court
denied the motion for continuance and issued an order restricting GM's
use of crash tests. 91
GM petitioned the court of appeals for mandamus relief on both issues.92 The court of appeals denied the mandamus request, reasoning
that GM had failed to demonstrate the lack of an adequate remedy by
appeal. 93 Although denying mandamus relief, the court of appeals issued
an opinion questioning the trial court's rulings on the continuance motion
and the use of crash tests. 94 The plaintiffs asked the trial court to reconsider its orders regarding the crash tests and the continuance. 95 GM filed
a petition for mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court. 96 The
Supreme Court dismissed GM's petition as premature to allow the trial
its ruling on both issues in light of the
court the opportunity to reconsider
97
court of appeals' opinion.
85. 943 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, orig. proceeding).

86. Id. at 532.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. 940 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
90. See id. at 598.
91. See id. at 599.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. Notably, the trial court declined to reconsider its ruling despite the court of
appeal's disapproval. As a result, General Motors was forced to refile its petition for writ
of mandamus with the Supreme Court. Mandamus relief was ultimately granted by the
Supreme Court. General Motors, 951 S.W.2d at 469.
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4. Mandamus JurisdictionDespite Right to Immediate Appeal
a.

Class Certification

In Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals,98 the
Supreme Court denied mandamus relief to Deloitte & Touche for failure
to show extraordinary circumstances that would make an interlocutory
appeal inadequate. 99 Notably, the Court did not foreclose the possibility
of reviewing procedural irregularities committed by a court of appeals in
an interlocutory appeal. 10 0
In dissent, Justice Spector argued that the Supreme Court never has
jurisdiction, mandamus or otherwise, over interlocutory appeals because
the Legislature has expressly provided the courts of appeals with conclusive authority over such intermediate appeals. 0 1
b.

Injunctions and Constitutional Issues

In Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz,'0 2 the Supreme Court considered
its mandamus jurisdiction over a case in which the parties had the right to
an interlocutory appeal. In Dietz, a group of Republicans who supported
equal rights for gay and lesbian individuals sought an injunction in the
trial court after they were denied access to the Republican Party of Texas
Convention. 10 3 The group asserted both constitutional and breach of
contract claims. 10 4 On Friday, June 14, 1996, the trial court issued an order temporarily enjoining the Republican Party from refusing to provide
a booth and advertisement to the group. 10 5
On Monday, June 17, 1996, the Republican Party filed a petition for
writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court and an emergency motion
to stay the temporary injunction. 0 6 The Supreme Court requested an
expedited response from the plaintiffs and set the case for oral argument
on June 19, 1996, one day before the convention began. 10 7 The Court
granted a stay in a per curiam opinion.' 0 8 Some eight months later, the
Court issued an opinion, providing a more detailed explanation as to why
it granted the stay.' 0 9
After concluding that the group was not likely to succeed on its breach
of contract and constitutional law claims, the Court reasoned that the
constitutional issues, the statewide importance of the claims raised, and
the short time frame in which the issues had to be decided provided
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

951
See
See
See
940
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding).
id. at 397.
id. at 398.
id. at 398-400 (Spector, J., dissenting).
S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding).
id. at 87-88.
id. at 88.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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"unique and compelling reasons" justifying the Court's exercise of mandamus jurisdiction over the case. 110 The Court then dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus as moot, finding that the order staying the trial
court's temporary injunctive relief provided the Republican Party with all
the relief to which it was entitled."'
Also looking to the immediate and compelling circumstances surrounding the election process, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals (sitting en
banc) conditionally granted mandamus when a trial court declared a mayoral election void and brought into question who had authority to govern
the city. 112 Citing Dietz, the court reasoned that despite the would-be
mayor's right to an accelerated appeal, the issue of who is the appropriate
mayor creates unique and compelling circumstances justifying mandamus
relief." 3 Moreover, the court reasoned, mandamus is appropriate to
remedy illegal efforts to oust an elected official. 1 4 In dissent, two justices
disagreed, arguing that the relator had an adequate remedy by acceler15
ated appeal, making mandamus inappropriate and unnecessary.
5. Exclusive Jurisdiction
In some limited circumstances the Supreme Court has exclusive mandamus jurisdiction. For instance, the Government Code comports exclusive jurisdiction to the Court over an officer of an executive department
of the Texas government."l 6 Attempting to invoke this exclusive jurisdiction in City of Arlington v. Nadig,117 the City of Arlington sought mandamus relief directly from the Supreme Court after the Texas Workers'
Compensation Commission (TWCC) refused to reimburse the City pursuant to a trial court's order to do so."18 Denying mandamus relief, the
Supreme Court held that members of state boards are not "officers of
[an] executive department" within the meaning of section 22.002(c) of the
Government Code, and the Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving them. 119
6.

Compelling Circumstances Excusing Failure to First Seek Relief in
Court of Appeals

The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief in two companion cases
involving the Secretary of State's failure to certify a candidate for the
Texas State House of Representatives. In Bird v. Rothstein, 2 0 the Demo110. Id. at 94.
111. See id.
112. See De Alejandro v. Hunter, 951 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997, orig. proceeding).
113. See id. at 105.
114. See id. at 106.
115. See id. at 107 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
116. See TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(c) (Vernon 1988).
117. 960 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
118. See id. at 642.
119. Id.
120. 930 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
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cratic Party properly nominated candidate Bird for an open seat in the
State House of Representatives, but failed to timely deliver the nomination form to the Secretary of State. 121 Because the Secretary of State
received the nomination late, the Secretary refused to certify the Bird
candidacy. 122 Bird filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly with the
123
Supreme Court.
The Court held that the circumstances in Bird were sufficiently compelling to excuse his failure to first seek relief in the court of appeals. 124 The
Court conditionally granted mandamus, ordering the Secretary of State
to certify Bird's candidacy. 125 The Court openly criticized the Secretary
for failing to abide by the Court's recent decision in Davis v. Taylor.126 In
Davis, the Court held that a candidate is entitled to a writ of mandamus
directing a party official to comply with the statutory deadline under the
Election Code so that the party official may perform his duties. 127
In dissent, Justice Owen (joined by Justice Cornyn) urged that while
mandamus was appropriate in Davis, the Court's order should have been
directed to the district committee director rather than the Secretary of
128
State.
7. Standards of Review
Petitions for writs of mandamus are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 29 the Supreme Court denied Griffin Industries' request for
mandamus relief because it believed the court of appeals correctly applied this standard. 130 In Griffin Industries,Villegas, the appellant, filed
an affidavit of inability to pay costs in lieu of a cost bond under former
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40.131 Griffin Industries and the
court reporter both challenged the affidavit. 132 The trial court sustained
the contest. 133 Villegas sought mandamus review of the trial court's action in the court of appeals. 134
121. See id. at 587.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 588. See also Davis v. Taylor, 930 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding).
125. See Bird, 930 S.W.2d at 588.
126. 930 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
127. See id.
128. See Bird, 930 S.W.2d at 588 (Owen, J., dissenting).
129. 934 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
130. See id. at 350.
131. See id. at 350. Rule 40 provided in relevant part, "When the appellant is unable to
pay the cost of appeal ... he shall be entitled to prosecute an appeal ... by filing with the
clerk ... his affidavit stating that he is unable to pay the costs of appeal." TEX. R. App. P.
40(a)(3)(A) (now TEX. R. App. P. 20.1).
132. See Griffin Indus., 934 S.W.2d at 350.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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The court of appeals granted mandamus relief, finding that "the trial
court abused its discretion in sustaining the contest ...because Villegas
' 135
proved that she was indigent and unable to pay the costs of appeal.
Agreeing with the court of appeals, the Supreme Court denied Griffin
Industries' petition for writ of mandamus. 136 The Court reasoned that
proof that an appellant's reliance on public assistance is sufficient to establish inability to pay costs on appeal under former Rule 40.137 The
Court further explained that even if the attorney is obligated to pay costs
through a contingency fee agreement but will not or cannot do so, the
138
appellant will not be stripped of indigent status.
In dissent, Justice Baker (joined by Justice Enoch) emphasized that the
standard for mandamus review is abuse of discretion.' 39 To conclude that
Griffin Industries did not negate Villegas' prima facie case of inability to
pay, the dissent argued, the Court impermissibly reweighed the evidence
140
and rejudged the witnesses' credibility.
B.

INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

1. Orders Denying or Granting Class Certification
"A person may appeal from an interlocutory order ... that certifies or
refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure .... ,,"41 What exactly does this mean? For example, is an order changing a class from opt-out to mandatory a permitted interlocutory appeal under this statute? It is, according to the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in De Los Santos v. Occidental Chemical
142
Corp.
In De Los Santos, the defendant chemical companies were faced with
more than 8,600 similar injury claims and approximately 500 other lawsuits in connection with an accidental chemical release from a butadiene
plant. 143 The "defendants moved the trial court . . . to certify a
mandatory plaintiffs' class of all persons claiming injury from the incident."'1 44 The district court first denied the motion and then granted the
defendants' motion over the plaintiffs' protest. 145 Some plaintiffs appealed the trial court's order. 146 While the interlocutory appeal was
pending, the plaintiffs repeatedly urged the trial court to reconsider its
ruling.' 47 The case was then transferred to another trial court, "which
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 351.
id. at 354.
id. at 351.
id. at 354.
id. at 355 (Baker, J., dissenting).
id. at 357-58 (Baker, J., dissenting).
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
933 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
See id. at 494.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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promptly granted the motions to reconsider and certified the class not as
a mandatory one but as an opt-out class."' 148 Certain plaintiffs opted out
and the case went to trial. 14 9 Ultimately, the defendants offered to settle
the case conditioned on certification of a mandatory class. 150
The trial court
settlement.
the
approved
and
class
mandatory
a
certified
The plaintiffs that opted out appealed the trial court's interlocutory order certifying the class and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. 151 "The court of appeals reasoned that the order
certifying a mandatory class only enlarged the size of the existing opt-out
class and thus was not an order from which interlocutory appeal could be
taken under Section 51.014. '' 152 Disagreeing with the appellate court's
conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court held that "[c]hanging a class from
opt-out to mandatory does not simply enlarge its membership; it alters
1 53
the fundamental nature of the class."'
2.

Orders Denying a Claim of Immunity

One of the few pre-trial rulings that may be appealed before final judgment is an order denying summary judgment based on an assertion of
immunity:
A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district
court, county court at law, or county court that.., denies a motion
for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by
an individual who is an officer54or employee of the state or a political
subdivision of the state .... 1
Does the statute's "assertion of immunity" requirement have to be a direct grant of immunity or can it be indirect? The Texas Supreme Court in
Newman v. Obersteller'55 held that a statute granting indirect immunity is
56
an "immunity statute" within the meaning of section 51.014(a)(5).
In Newman, a high school student sued the head coach and athletic
director of his high school, as well as the school district for alleged mistreatment resulting in emotional damage. 57 Both the school district and
148. Id.
149. See id.

150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 495. The court of appeals relied on Pierce Mortuary Colleges, Inc. v. Bjerke,
841 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) in reaching this conclusion. The
Pierce Mortuary court held that "an order changing the size of a class only modifies a
certification order and is not an order certifying or refusing to certify a class from which an
interlocutory appeal will lie." De Los Santos, 933 S.W.2d at 495 (citing Pierce Mortuary,
841 S.W.2d at 880-81)).
153. Id. "In Pierce Mortuary, new members were added to the class prior to trial, but
the relationship of class members to each other and their attorneys was not affected by the
expansion." Id. Pierce Mortuary, the Court concluded, "cannot be stretched to cover this
case." Id.
154. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
155. 960 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1997).
156. Id. at 621-22.
157. See id. at 622.
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coach moved for summary judgment claiming governmental immunity. 158
The trial court initially granted summary judgment for both the coach and
school district, but vacated the summary judgment for the coach on the
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. 159 The trial court then severed the
case against the school district, rendering the summary judgment for the
district a final judgment. 160 The plaintiff did not challenge or appeal the
161
summary judgment for the school district.
Thereafter, the coach filed a second motion for summary judgment,
claiming an affirmative defense of immunity under section 101.106 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 162 Under section 101.106, a
judgment in an action against a governmental unit precludes an action
against an employee of that unit. 163 The coach, therefore, argued that,
under section 101.106, the unchallenged summary judgment for the
64
school district rendered the coach immune from any further action.
The trial court denied the coach's second motion and the coach appealed
under section 51.014(a)(5). 165 The court of appeals refused to exercise
166
jurisdiction over the coach's interlocutory appeal.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The Court concluded that section
101.106 is an immunity statute for purposes of section 51.014(a)(5) because "[t]he language 'bars any action' is an unequivocal grant of immunity in this context."'1 67 The fact, the Court held, "that section 101.106
does not use the word 'immunity' is of no consequence," given "the structure and intent of the Tort Claims Act."'1 68 As a result, "the court of
appeals erred by not exercising jurisdiction over [the coach's] interlocu1 69
tory appeal under section 51.014(a)(5).9'

158. See id. The parties claimed immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See id.;
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1994 & Supp 1998).
159. See Newman, 960 S.W.2d at 622.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.; TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106 (Vernon 1997).

163. Newman, 960 S.W.2d at 622. Section 101.106 provides: "A judgment in an action
or settlement of a claim under this chapter bars any action involving the same subject
matter by the claimant against the employee of the governmental unit whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106 (Vernon
1997).
164. See Newman, 960 S.W.2d at 622.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The Supreme Court further rendered judgment for the coach, holding "that
section 101.106 render[ed] [the coach] immune from further action in [the] matter." Id.
The dissent argued that section 51.014(a)(5) contemplates only direct grants of immunity
and section 101.106 is not a grant of immunity, direct or indirect. See id. at *3 (Abbott, J.,
dissenting). As a result, the dissent concluded, the denial of summary judgment based on
section 101.106 "does not fall within the ambit of section 51.014(a)(5)" and the court of
appeals had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory order. Id. at *4.
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3. Orders Compelling Arbitration
The San Antonio Court of Appeals recently affirmed that an order
compelling arbitration under the Texas or Federal Arbitration Acts is an
unappealable interlocutory order. 170 A trial court's order compelling arbitration is an interlocutory order, and appeals of interlocutory orders are
permitted only by statute. 171 "The general Texas statute permitting appeal of interlocutory orders does not include an order compelling arbitration as one [that] may be appealed.' 172 Neither does the Texas
Arbitration Act. 173 The Texas Arbitration Act provides only for an interlocutory appeal from an order "(1) denying an application to compel arbitration . . .; (2) granting an application to stay arbitration . . .; (3)

confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (4) modifying or correcting an award; or (5) vacating an award without directing a rehearing."'1 74 As a result, an order compelling arbitration is an unappealable
75
interlocutory order.'
Further, as the appellant in Elm Creek learned, a party cannot circumvent section 171.098 by arguing that they are really appealing the denial
of an injunction requesting a stay of the arbitration proceedings. 176
While "[s]ection 51.014(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code authorizes an interlocutory appeal from orders granting or denying
a temporary injunction," an appellant cannot attempt to circumvent section 171.098 "by cloaking an otherwise unappealable order in injunction
terms."1

77

170. See Elm Creek Villas Homeowner Ass'n, Inc. v. Beldon Roofing & Remodeling
Co., 940 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
171. See id.
172. Id. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.
1998).
173. See id. § 171.098 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
174. Id. § 171.098(a)(1)-(a)(5).
175. See Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 154. Accord Gathe v. Cigna Healthplan of Tex., Inc.,
879 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Bethke v.
Polyco, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Callaway, 597 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd). But see Jack
B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) ("Both the Texas and Federal
[Arbitration] Acts permit a party to appeal from an interlocutory order granting or deny-

ing a request to compel arbitration."). The Elm Creek court, as well as other courts of
appeals, have concluded that the Supreme Court's statement in Jack B. Anglin is dicta and
elect not to follow it. See Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 154. In refusing to follow the Supreme
Court's statement in Jack B. Anglin, these courts of appeals reason that (1) Jack B. Anglin
was a mandamus proceeding, not an appeal, (2) the order at issue was an order denying
(not granting) an application to compel arbitration, (3) the Court's statement is not supported in the language of the Texas Arbitration Act, and (4) the cases cited by the
Supreme Court state that an order denying arbitration is appealable, but do not address
orders compelling arbitration. See Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 154.
176. See Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 154-55.
177. Id. As the appellant in Elm Creek further learned, attempting to do so may result
in an assessment of appellate sanctions. See id. at 155-56. Following its holding in Elm
Creek, the San Antonio Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of an order compelling
arbitration in Materials Evolution Dev. USA, Inc. v. Jablonowski, 949 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). As in Elm Creek, the court held that the order compelling arbitration was not final and an interlocutory appeal of the order is not expressly
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Conducting a nearly identical analysis, the Dallas Court of Appeals in
Lipshy Motorcars,Inc. v. Sovereign Associates, Inc.1 78 similarly concluded
that it had no jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of an179order granting a motion to compel arbitration and a stay of litigation.
4.

Protective Orders Under the Texas Family Code

Under the Texas Family Code, a trial court may render a protective
order if the court finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to
occur in the future. 180 A protective order is effective for the period specified by the trial court, but cannot exceed one year. 18 1 "During [the] effective period, the trial court retains the power and jurisdiction to modify
the protective order either by removing 182
items included or including items
not previously contained in the order."
Is an interlocutory protective order entered under the Texas Family
Code appealable? Facing this issue in Normand v. Fox, a majority of the
Waco Court of Appeals held that the protective order at issue was interlocutory and not subject to appeal.' 83 The court first noted that family
protective orders entered under the Texas Family Code do not fall within
the parameters for interlocutory review under the general Texas statute
permitting appeal of interlocutory orders. 184 The court then noted that
"Title 4 of the Family Code does not provide for interlocutory appeal" of
protective orders.' 85 The court thus concluded that the protective order
was not an appealable interlocutory order and that it could only be re86
viewed if it qualified as a final judgment.'
To be a final and appealable, the court noted, a "judgment must settle
all disputed material issues between the parties which require the exerauthorized by either the general Texas statute permitting appeal of certain types of interlocutory orders or the Texas Arbitration Act. See id. at 33; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 171.098 (Vernon Supp. 1998). Unlike in Elm Creek, however, the court denied the appellee's motion for sanctions, finding that the appellant did not bring the appeal for the purpose of delay or without sufficient cause. See Materials Evolution, 949 S.W.2d at 33.
178. 944 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ).
179. See id. at 70. As did the court in Elm Creek, the Dallas court in Lipshy rejected as
"dicta" the Supreme Court's comment on the appealability of an interlocutory order compelling arbitration in Jack B. Anglin, stating that it "contradicts the very authority [the
Supreme Court] cites." Lipshy, 944 S.W.2d at 70. In contrast to the Elm Creek court,
however, the Dallas court refused to entertain the appellee's motion for appellate sanctions, holding that "[o]nce a court determines it has no jurisdiction ... , all it can do is
declare its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss." Id. at 72. The court has no jurisdiction to
consider a motion for sanctions. See id.
180. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.001 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
181. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
182. Normand v. Fox, 940 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
183. See id. at 403-04.
184. See id. at 403; TEX. Civ. PrAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 1998).
185. Normand, 940 S.W.2d at 403. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 4 (Vernon 1996 &
Supp. 1998).
186. See Normand, 940 S.W.2d at 403.
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cise of judicial discretion.' 1 87 The court ultimately determined that the
trial court's modification power under the Family Code clouded the protective order's finality.' 88 As a result, a protective order entered under
the Family Code "is not a final, appealable order."'1 89 The dissent disagreed, contending that the protective order disposed of all issues between the parties and was therefore final and appealable.' 90
Interestingly, both the majority and dissent advocated mandamus as an
appropriate remedy to challenge a protective order entered under the
Texas Family Code. 19 1 Moreover, both called upon the Texas Legislature
to amend the Family Code or another appropriate statute to make a protective order entered under the Family Code a final order that can be
reviewed on appeal on an accelerated basis. 192
The El Paso Court of Appeals also dismissed for want of jurisdiction an
appeal of a protective order entered under the Texas Family Code, but on
different grounds. Specifically, in Ruiz v. Ruiz, 193 the El Paso court held
that a protective order granted while a divorce action is pending between
parties is not a final judgment when the protective order is consolidated
with the divorce action and the divorce action includes unresolved issues
like child custody, support, and property division. 194 Under these circumstances, the protective order is not final because it does not dispose of all
issues in the case and no affirmative statutory authority exists authorizing
interlocutory appellate review of the order1 95
The Ruiz court noted the controversy over whether a protective order
issued under the Family Code is, or should be, considered a final appealable order. 196 The court decided, however, that it did not need to reach
the merits of the controversy since the order in Ruiz was not an independent action disposing of all issues between the parties.' 97 In line
with the majority and dissent in Normand, the Ruiz court concluded that
absent action by the Legislature, "the method for seeking review of a
protective order entered during pendency of a divorce is mandamus.' 98
5.

Charging Orders
In a case of first impression, the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Dis-

187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 405 (Vance, J., dissenting). The dissent specifically rejected the majority's conclusion that the court's ability to modify the order "clouds it finality." Id. "Once
modified, the new order would also be final, assuming it disposed of all issues and parties."
Id.
191. See id. at 404.
192. See id.
193. 946 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ) (per curiam).
194. See id. at 124.
195. See id.
196. See id. (citing Normand v. Fox, 940 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ)).
197. See id.
198. Id.
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pensa v. University State Bank1 99 considered the appealability of a charging order.20 0 Seeking enforcement of its judgment, the judgment creditor
in Dispensa sought a charging order against the judgment debtor's interest in a partnership, as well as a turnover order and the appointment of a
receiver. 20 1 The trial court granted the judgment creditor's request and
issued a charging order.20 2 The judgment debtor appealed the order by
erred in issuing the order
writ of error, contending that the trial 20court
3
him.
over
jurisdiction
lacked
it
because
Acknowledging that interlocutory orders may be appealed in limited
circumstances, 20 4 the court of appeals concluded that none of the statutory exceptions applied to the charging order. 20 5 Further, the court held
that the order was not final because it did not address the judgment creditor's request for a turnover order and appointment of a receiver. 20 6 Due
to these defects in the charging order, the court dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction.
Notably, the court of appeals had no need and refused to decide the
question of whether a charging order itself is a final, appealable judgment. 20 7 The court pointed out, however, that "as a general rule, the
and collection of a final
usual writs and orders used to aid enforcement
20 8
appealable.
not
are
judgment
money
III.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

In Galveston County Fair & Rodeo, Inc. v. Glover,20 9 the parents of a

county fair contestant brought suit for breach of contract against a county
fair company, complaining that the Fair had misapplied its rules and improperly disqualified their son's steer from competition on the grounds
that the steer had been unethically "fitted" or "injected with air to make
it appear larger and smoother. ' 210 The Fair orally objected to the submission of the proposed jury question on wrongful disqualification (which
did not contain any instruction on the "fitting" issue) as speculative and
tendered in writing three proposed questions tied to the specific provisions of the Fair's rules, one of which was accompanied by an instruction
211
on "unethical fitting."
The trial court rejected the Fair's objections and refused to submit the
199. 951 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).
200. See id. at 798-99.
201. See id. at 799.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See Dispensa, 951 S.W.2d at 799. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. &
§ 51.014 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
205. See Dispensa, 951 S.W.2d at 799.
206. See id. at 800.
207. See id. at 801 n.7.
208. Id.
209. 940 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. 1996).
210. Id. at 586.
211. See id. at 586.
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Fair's questions and instruction. 212 Affirming the trial court's judgment
against the Fair, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing the tendered submission and that the Fair failed
to separately request in writing any definitions or instructions on "wrongful disqualification" as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 273.213
Reaffirming the vitality of its holding in State Department of Highways
and Public Transportation v. Payne,214 the Supreme Court held that the
trial court erred in its submission of the wrongful disqualification question and that the Fair's oral objection and written request "left no room
for misunderstanding of its complaints" and complied with Rule 273.215
The Supreme Court held that the error was not harmful, however, because the jury's affirmative answer to a separate breach of contract question, submitted without objection by the Fair, was sufficient to support
216
the judgment.
In Yazdi v. Republic Insurance Co.,217 the San Antonio Court of Appeals applied the Payne test in a dispute between a homeowner and his
insurer concerning the alleged theft of oriental rugs and other items from
the insured's condominium. 218 The court of appeals held that, even
under the Supreme Court's "simplified and loosened" 219 test in Payne for
determining whether a party has preserved error in the jury charge, the
insured's request that a definition of the word "false" be added to the
fraud question did not preserve error because no written tender of the
requested definition was made. 220 The court of appeals also held that the
homeowner waived the specific objections to the charge complained of
2 21
on appeal by failing to raise them before the trial court.
IV. JUDGMENTS
A.

CONSENT JUDGMENTS

Unless all parties consent to an agreement underlying the judgment at
222
the time of rendition, a court cannot render a valid consent judgment.
Further, a trial court should not enter a consent judgment if it has information that would "reasonably prompt further inquiry, and such inquiry,
if pursued, would disclose a lack of consent. '223 A party, of course, may
224 If
revoke its consent, but must do so before the judgment is rendered.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 586-87. See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
214. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
215. See 940 S.W.2d at 586-87; TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
216. See id. at 587.
217. 935 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
218. See id. at 876-77.
219. Id. at 879.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See First Heights Bank, FSB v. Marom, 934 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
223. Id.
224. See id. at 844-45.
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a party wishing to revoke consent does so after the judgment is rendered,
the trial court commits no error in signing the agreed judgment. 225
This is so, even if the agreed judgment signed by the court prior to the
withdrawal of consent is interlocutory. 226 Once the trial court renders an
agreed interlocutory judgment, a party may not withdraw its consent if, at
227
the time of rendition, the trial court was not aware of any objection.
The interlocutory nature of the rendered agreed judgment does not impact this rule because the entry of final judgment "is a purely ministerial
act by which [the previously rendered] judgment is made of record and
preserved. '228 In short, consent cannot be withdrawn once judgment is
rendered, regardless of the date of entry of final judgment.
A trial court, however, has no power to render an agreed judgment
unless and until "all the terms of a final judgment have been definitely
agreed upon by all parties and those terms either reduced to writing or
placed of record. .2. ,29 Where at least one essential element of agreement is left undecided by the parties' agreement, the trial court is "with'230
out power to render a judgment by agreement.
Moreover, an agreed judgment must be rendered in "strict or literal
compliance" with the parties' agreement. 231 To the extent the trial
court's judgment goes beyond the terms of the parties' agreement, it is
void. 232 On appeal, the proper disposition of an improperly rendered
agreed judgment is reversal and remand "without prejudice to the rights
of the parties to seek to enforce, or to avoid enforcement of, the settle233
ment agreement.

B.

RENDERING JUDGMENT

"Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its de225. See id. at 845.
226. See id.
227. See id. As explained by the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in First Heights,
there is a distinction between an agreement between the parties pertaining to the lawsuit
and an agreed interlocutory judgment incorporating the terms of the parties' agreement.
See id. For the former, "consent may be withdrawn prior to the entry of a judgment incorporating the agreement of the parties;" in fact, "entry of a judgment in the absence of that
continuing consent is prohibited." Id. For the latter, however, "once the trial court renders an agreed judgment, a party may not withdraw its consent if at the time of rendition
the trial court was not aware of any objection." Id.
228. Id. at 845-46.
229. Reppert v. Beasley, 943 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
230. Id. The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Reppert held that the trial court erred in
rendering an agreed judgment where it was evident that the parties had not agreed
whether the judgment would be self-enforcing through the trial court's contempt power or
enforceable only through a breach of contract action. See id.
231. Id. at 175. See also Keim v. Anderson, 943 S.W.2d 938, 946 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1997, no writ).
232. See Reppert, 943 S.W.2d at 175.
233. Id. at 174. Where a trial court improperly modifies a stipulated division of the
parties' property in the divorce context, the trial court on remand may "reject the [parties']
agreement on the grounds that it does not constitute a just and right division of the parties'
estates." Keim, 943 S.W.2d at 946.
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cision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. 234
Rendition and entry of judgment are distinguishable; entry of judgment
"is a purely ministerial act by which judgment is made of record and preserved. '235 To render judgment, the trial court must use words that
"clearly indicate the intent to render judgment at the time the words are
expressed. '2 3 6 "[A] judge's intention to render judgment in the future
cannot be a present rendition of judgment. '23 7 Rather, "the rendition of
judgment is a present act, either by spoken word or signed'2 memorandum,
38
which decides the issues upon which the ruling is made.
C.

FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS

Relying in part on the First District Court of Appeals' decision in Atchison v. Weingarten Realty Management Co.,239 the El Paso Court of Appeals held in Villalba v. Fashing240 that an order that fails to expressly
dispose of claims asserted by an intervening third party is not final even if
the underlying action is a condition precedent to the third party's claims
24 1
and the underlying action has been dismissed for want of prosecution.
Specifically, in Villalba, a third party judgment creditor of Villalba filed
an intervention for recovery of its judgment in a lawsuit brought by Villalba against his former employer for wrongful discharge.2 42 Ultimately,
Villalba's wrongful discharge case was dismissed for want of prosecution.2 43 The trial court's order dismissing Villalba's claims did not specifically mention the intervening judgment creditor's plea. 244 More than
thirty days after the order was signed, Villalba sought to reinstate the
lawsuit based on his assertion that he never received notice of the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit. 245 The defendant (Villalba's former employer) argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to reinstate the case
because the order of dismissal was final, having disposed of the intervenor's claim by "necessary implication. '246 That is, "because the trial
court dismissed the underlying action, which was a condition precedent to
the [judgment creditor's] action, the order also dismissed the bank's
24 7
action."
The court of appeals disagreed. "To be final," the court of appeals
234. Keim, 943 S.W.2d at 942.
235. Id.

236. Id.
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Id. The court's statement, in part, that "I will grant the divorce as of this time"
indicated an intent to render judgment at the time the words were spoken. Id. at 942-43.
239. 916 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
240. 951 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, orig. proceeding).
241. See id. at 488-89.
242. See id. at 487.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 488.
245. See id. at 487.
246. Id. at 488.
247. Id.
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held, "a judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in a case. '2 48 In
determining finality, "a reviewing court applies different presumptions
...depending on whether the judgment follows a trial on the merits or a
summary or default judgment. '2 4 9 After a trial on the merits, the judgment is presumed final.2 50 After a summary or default disposition, no
such presumption is applied. 25 ' That is, "[a] summary disposition that
[only] implicitly, but not explicitly, dispose[s] of claims is not a final appealable judgment.12 52 As a result, even if the trial court implicitly dismissed the judgment creditor's claim by dismissing the underlying action,
the court's failure to expressly dispose of that claim rendered the order
interlocutory and the trial court maintained jurisdiction to reinstate the
suit.2 53

D.

JUDGMENTS NUNC PRO TUNC

In Traylor Brothers, Inc. v. Garcia,254 the San Antonio Court of Appeals recently affirmed that a judgment nunc pro tunc is proper to correct
an error in the signing date of a.judgment and that such correction can be
made "at any time," including after the expiration of the trial court's ple255
nary power.
A judgment labeled "Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc," however, is not a
judgment nunc pro tunc if it does "more than correct purely clerical errors. '256 For example, although the trial court in Matz labeled two postjudgment orders "Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc," the court of appeals determined that the post-judgment orders did not merely correct clerical er248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Id. (emphasis added).
253. See id. at 489. The First District Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion
during the Survey period in Dardariv. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc., 961 S.W.2d 466
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 11, 1997, no pet. h.). In Dardari,the court of appeals
rejected the notion that a claim that is entirely derivative of the underlying claims is dismissed by necessary implication when the underlying claims are dismissed. See id. at 469.
When a case is dismissed for want of prosecution, the court explained, "there is no presumption that the dismissal order also disposed of issues in an independent cross-action or
counterclaim." Id.
254. 949 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
255. Id. at 369-70. The court noted that the rules governing whether an incorrect date
may be corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc after the expiration of the trial court's
plenary power are Rules 316 and 329b(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at
369. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 316 provides that "Clerical mistakes in the record of
any judgment may be corrected by the judge in open court according to the truth or justice
of the case." TEX. R. Civ. P. 316. Rule 329b(f) provides that "the court may at any time
correct a clerical error in the record of a judgment and render judgment nunc pro tunc
under Rule 316." TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(f). The court further cited to interpretative case
law holding that dates contained in judgments are the "type of errors that are correctable
by judgment nunc pro tunc." Traylor, 949 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Polis v. Alford, 267 S.W.2d
918, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, no writ) (per curiam); Ortiz v. O.J. Beck &
Sons, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)).
256. Matz v. Bennion, 961 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997,
n.w.h.).
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rors but, rather, were orders enforcing the trial court's original
judgment. 2 57 "[A] title of a document," the court held, "does not necessarily control the nature of its content. '258
V. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A.

MOTIONS FOR

NEW

TRIAL

In Estate of Townes v. Wood,259 the First District Court of Appeals
sitting en banc construed the "written order" requirement of Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 329b(c). 260 Noting that the trial court had orally
granted the defendant's motion for new trial on the record, made and
initialed a docket entry stating "MNT granted," and signed an order setting the case for trial, 261 the majority of the court held that neither the
plain language of Rule 329b(c) 262 nor the Supreme Court's holding in
Faulkner v. Culver263 were satisfied by the signing of an order that set the

case for trial but did not determine the merits of the motion for new

trial.2 64 Four dissenting justices argued that, while the actions of the trial

court in orally granting the motion for new trial on the record and making
the entry "MNT granted" on the docket sheet were not sufficient to satisfy the "written order" requirement, the additional and simultaneous
step of signing an order setting the case for trial was, when considered in
the overall context, sufficient to satisfy the rule. 265
In Nuchia v. Woodruff,266 the court of appeals held that a motion for
new trial directed at an interlocutory judgment, filed and overruled
nearly six months before the final judgment appealed from, operated to
extend the appellate timetable under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
257. See id.
258. Id. The court rejected the appellant's contention that the post-judgment orders
"were void because the trial court had lost plenary jurisdiction to change its judgment." Id.
See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d) (trial court has plenary power for thirty days after judgment is signed to grant new trial or vacate, modify, correct or reform judgment). The
appellee argued that the documents were "orders to enforce the trial court's original judgment, which the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to enter." Matz, 961 S.W.2d at 450.
See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 308 (trial court has authority "to enforce its orders and decrees
beyond its plenary power"). Matz, 961 S.W.2d at 450. Agreeing with the appellee, the
court found that no terms of the orders constituted "a material change in substantial adjudicated portions of the judgment." Id. at 451 (citing Katz v. Bianchi, 848 S.W.2d 372, 374
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding)).
259. 934 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding) (en banc).
260. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). Rule 329b(c) states, in pertinent part, that "[i]n the event
an original ... motion for new trial ... is not determined by written order signed within
seventy-five days after the judgment was signed, it shall be considered overruled by operation of law on expiration of that period." Id.
261. See Estate of Townes, 934 S.W.2d at 806.
262. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
263. 851 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
264. See Estate of Townes, 934 S.W.2d at 807.
265. See id. at 808-09.
266. 956 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 2, 1997, no pet. h.).
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306c 267 and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58(a). 268 Relying on Harris County Hospital Districtv. Estrada,269 the appellants in Nuchia argued
that their April 10, 1995, motion for new trial, directed at an earlier interlocutory judgment in the case and overruled almost five months before
the October 5, 1995, final judgment, extended the appellate timetable and
made the filing of the transcript timely. 270 The appellee, relying on A.G.
Solar & Co. v. Nordyke,27 1 argued that the motion for new trial could not
"assail" the final judgment because it was overruled before the final judg272
ment was signed and, as a result, was not a live pleading.
Acknowledging the conflict between Estrada and Solar, the court of
appeals followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in
Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Co. and held
that the motion operated to extend the appellate deadlines. 27 3 In
Fredonia, a preservation of error case, the Supreme Court declined to
resolve the conflict between Solar and Estradaas to whether a motion for
new trial overruled by operation of law is effective to extend the appellate timetable for appeal from a subsequent judgment.2 74 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court held that, with respect to preservation of error, the
reasoning of Estrada is better, and observed that a "live pleading" requirement would defeat the purpose of the rules enacted to assure that
cases are not dismissed because the motion for new trial was filed too
soon.

275

Finally, in Tate v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,276 the Supreme
Court held that "a motion for new trial timely presented to the district
clerk without the required filing fee extends the appellate timetable,"
where the fee is paid "after the motion is overruled by operation of law
but before the trial court loses plenary jurisdiction. '277 Extending its
holding in Jamar v. Patterson,278 in which the appellate timetable was held
to be extended by the timely tender of a motion for new trial when the
filing fee was paid by the movant before the motion was overruled, the
Supreme Court held that, while "the failure to pay the fee before the
motion is overruled... may forfeit.., the movant's opportunity to have
267. See id. at 615. See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 306c. Rule 306c provides that "[n]o motion
for new trial ... shall be held ineffective because prematurely filed; but every such motion
shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of but subsequent to the time of signing of
Id.
the judgment the motion assails ....
268. See Nuchia, 956 S.W.2d at 615. See also TEX. R. App. P. 58(a). Rule 58(a) provides that "[p]roceedings relating to an appeal need not be considered ineffective because
of prematurity if a subsequent appealable order has been signed to which the premature
proceeding may properly be applied." Id.
269. 831 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
270. See Nuchia, 956 S.W.2d at 612.
271. 744 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
272. See Nuchia, 956 S.W.2d at 614.
273. 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
274. See id. at 282 n.2.
275. See id. at 282.
276. 934 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1996).
277. Id. at 83.
278. 868 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1993).
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the trial court consider the motion," the failure to pay the fee before the
motion is overruled does not "retroactively invalidate the conditional filing for purposes of the appellate timetable. '279
The Supreme Court specifically declined to opine as to whether the
appellate timetable is extended if the filing fee is not paid before the trial
court loses plenary jurisdiction. 280 Also, the Court expressed no opinion
on the related question of whether a motion for new trial preserves error,
even though it may extend the appellate timetable, if the fee is paid after
the motion is overruled by operation of law. 281
Recognizing that the Supreme Court had left the issue unresolved in
Tate, the Waco Court of Appeals held in Polley v. Odom2 82 that a timely
tendered motion for new trial extended the appellate timetable when the
appellant paid the filing fee only after receiving the appellee's motion to
dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, more than six months after the
fee was due and long after the trial court lost plenary jurisdiction. 283 This
decision appears to be consistent with the majority of court of appeals
284
decisions on the issue.
B.

REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In IKB Industries (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp.,285 the Texas
Supreme Court clarified the circumstances in which the timely filing of a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extends the time for
perfecting appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a)(1) 286
and announced a rule of broad application. Following an evidentiary
hearing (for which there was no statement of facts), the trial court dismissed IKB's suit with prejudice as a sanction for discovery abuse, making seven pages of findings in its judgment "from the evidence before
it. "287
279. Tate, 934 S.W.2d at 84.
280. See id. at 84 n.l.
281. See id.
282. 937 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
283. See id. at 624-26.
284. See Spellman v. Hoang, 887 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no
writ) (appellate timetable extended by tender of motion for new trial where filing fee paid
after trial court loses plenary jurisdiction); Ramirez v. Get "N" Go # 103, 888 S.W.2d 29, 31
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (same). But see Arndt v. Arndt, 709 S.W.2d
281, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (motion for new trial does not
extend appellate timetable if the filing fee is not paid before the motion is either heard or
overruled).
285. 938 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1997).
286. See TEx. R. App. P. 41(a)(1). Rule 41(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
When security for costs on appeal is required, the bond or affidavit in lieu
thereof shall be filed with the clerk within thirty days after the judgment is
signed, or, within ninety days after the judgment is signed if... any party has
timely filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case
tried without a jury.
Id.
287. 1KB, 938 S.W.2d at 441.
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Eight days after the dismissal order was signed, IKB timely requested
findings of fact and conclusions of law, referring to Texas Rule of Civil
2 89
Procedure 296.288 The trial court did not respond to IKB's request.
Because IKB filed its cost bond forty-nine days after the dismissal order
was signed, its appeal was properly perfected "only if its request for findings and conclusions extended the deadline" for filing the cost bond from
thirty to ninety days after the judgment was signed. 290 The court of apfor findings and
peals dismissed IKB's appeal, holding that the request
29 1
conclusions did not extend the appellate timetable.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and announced the
following rule:
[A] timely filed request for findings of fact and conclusions of law
extends the time for perfecting appeal when findings and conclusions
are required by Rule 296, or when they are not required by Rule 296
but are not without purpose-that
is, they could properly be consid292
ered by the appellate court.
The Court's decision discusses the differing purposes of Rule 296 ("to
give a party a right to findings of fact and conclusions of law finally adjudicated after a conventional trial on the merits before the court") 293 and
Rule 41 ("to prescribe the time for perfecting appeal"). 294 Additionally,
the opinion follows a "functional" approach to Rule 41(a)(1) consistent
with the decision in Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 295 in which the Supreme
Court held that "'findings of fact and conclusions of law have no place in
a summary judgment proceeding.' ' 296 In a possible attempt to guide
practitioners in determining when a request for findings and conclusions
may be appropriate, the IKB opinion cites examples where findings and
conclusions can have no purpose (summary judgment, judgment after directed verdict, judgment non obstante veredicto, default judgment awarding liquidated damages, dismissal for want of prosecution without an
evidentiary hearing, dismissal for want of jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing, dismissal based on the pleadings or special exceptions, and
any judgment rendered without an evidentiary hearing), 297 as well as situations where findings and conclusions are not required by Rule 296 but
are not without purpose (judgment after a conventional bench trial, default judgment on a claim for unliquidated damages, judgment rendered
288. See id. See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 296. Rule 296 provides, in pertinent part, that
"[i]n any case tried in the district court or county court without a jury, any party may
request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Such request
...shall be filed within twenty days after judgment is signed." Id.
289. See 1KB, 938 S.W.2d at 441.
290. Id.
291. See IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 901 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. App.Dallas 1995).
292. IKB, 938 S.W.2d at 443.
293. Id. at 442.
294. Id.
295. 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994).
296. IKB, 938 S.W.2d at 440 (citing Linwood, 885 S.W.2d at 103).
297. See 1KB, 938 S.W.2d at 443.
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as sanctions, and any judgment based in any part on an evidentiary
29
hearing). 8
In dissent, Justice Baker urged the Court to adopt a rule providing that
the applicable appellate standard of review would determine whether a
request for findings and conclusions extends the time to appeal. 299 Under
this rule, a timely request for findings and conclusions would extend the
appellate timetable in cases where legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence is the standard of review, but would not do so in cases in which
abuse of discretion is the applicable standard of review, including dismis3°°
sal as a discovery sanction.
In two opinions handed down the same day as IKB, the Supreme Court
followed its decision in IKB and held that the appellate timetable was
extended by a request for findings and conclusions in a case in which
30 1
dismissal was ordered based on a want of jurisdiction and as a sanction,
3
0
2
and a case dismissed for want of prosecution.
In both cases, the
Supreme Court held that the time for filing the record was extended because the dismissal was based in whole or in part on an evidentiary
303
hearing.
In a suit seeking judicial review of an administrative order granting an
application to amend a solid waste permit, the Austin Court of Appeals
held that a request for findings of fact did not extend the appellate timetable when it was clear from the record that the trial court's judgment was
not based on evidence heard by the trial judge. 30 4 The court of appeals
also observed that, under the substantial evidence standard of review applicable to the case, the trial court was forbidden to receive evidence and
was required to "decide the questions of law at issue exclusively from the
agency record. '30 5
VI.

SUPERSEDING THE JUDGMENT

In Amwest Surety Insurance Company v. Graham,30 6 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals determined in a case of first impression whether a
surety that secures a judgment conditioned on the judgment debtor pursuing his appeal "with effect" has agreed to be responsible for the judgment entered on remand. 30 7 The court concluded that the surety's
continued liability is based not on whether the appeals court reviewed the
case on the merits, but on whether the judgment secured by the surety is
298. See id.
299. See id. at 444 (Baker, J., dissenting).
300. See id. at 444-46.
301. See Awde v. Dabeit, 938 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1997).
302. Phillips v. Beavers, 938 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1997).
303. See Awde, 938 S.W.2d at 33; Phillips, 938 S.W.2d at 447.
304. See City of Lancaster v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Comm'n, 935
S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (issued before the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in IKB).
305. Id. at 228.
306. 949 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
307. See id. at 729.
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affirmed or reversed. 30 8 Because the judgment in Amwest was reversed,
albeit on procedural grounds, the surety was discharged from its obliga30 9
tions under the supersedeas bond as a matter of law.
Finding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 755, read in conjunction
with section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code, does not exempt occupants as a private resident in a forcible entry and detainer suit from filing
a supersedeas bond, the El Paso Court of Appeals denied the appellants'
motion, per Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b), 310 to review and declare
311
a $19,000 supersedeas bond as excessive.
VII. PLENARY POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT
In Scott & White Memorial Hospital v. Schexnider,312 the Supreme
Court held that a trial court retains the power during its plenary jurisdiction to grant a motion for sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
13,313 though the movants were nonsuited by the party against whom
31 4
sanctions are sought before the sanctions motion was filed.
The plaintiffs in Scott & White filed a medical malpractice action, initially against Scott & White Memorial Hospital, Scott & White Clinic,
and eight Scott & White doctors. 315 The plaintiffs later named twentythree other Scott & White doctors as defendants. 31 6 More than two years
after suit was filed, all defendants moved for summary judgment, with the
defendant doctors supporting their motions with affidavits swearing that
317
the treatments they rendered met the applicable standard of care.
While the summary judgment motions were pending, the plaintiffs nonsuited all of the defendant doctors except for Doctors Nickel and Heriot.318 The trial court later granted a final summary judgment in favor of
all remaining defendants. All of the defendants, including those who had
been nonsuited, moved for Rule 13 sanctions, claiming that the suit was
"groundless and brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. Suspension of enforcement of judgment while on appeal is now governed by Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1. See TEX. R. App. P. 24.1.
311. See McCartney v. California Mortgage Serv., 951 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1997, n.w.h.) (per curiam).
312. 940 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. 1996).
313. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. Rule 13 provides, in pertinent part:
The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them that
they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of their
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instrument is not groundless and brought in bad faith ....If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction ....
Id.
314. See Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d at 595.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See id.
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as to all non-party movants. ' '319 After an evidentiary hearing conducted
before the expiration of its plenary jurisdiction, the trial court ordered
plaintiffs' counsel to pay $25,000 in sanctions to the nonsuited
320
defendants.
The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment and the sanctions
order, and held that, on the sanctions issue, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
162321 "deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant the motion for
sanctions [filed] after the nonsuit. ''322 The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, holding that Rule 162 did not apply because its application is limited to sanctions motions filed before the nonsuit takes place. 323
The Supreme Court's holding is instructive:
A trial court's power to decide a motion for sanctions pertaining to
matters occurring before judgment is no different than its power to
decide any other motion during its plenary jurisdiction ....Rule 162
merely acknowledges that a nonsuit does not affect the trial court's
authority to act on a pending sanctions motion; it does not purport to
limit the trial court's power to act on motions filed after a nonsuit. 324
In its decision, the Supreme Court disapproved of certain holdings in
two court of appeals decisions in the subject area. The court disapproved
the holding in Hjalmarson v. Langley325 (that a trial court must reinstate
a case before granting a Rule 13 motion filed after a nonsuit) 326 and the
holding in Wolma v. Gonzalez327 (that a trial court may sanction prejudgment conduct after the expiration of its plenary jurisdiction). 32 8
VIII.

STANDING TO APPEAL

In Preston v. American Eagle Insurance Company,329 the Dallas Court
of Appeals dismissed an appeal for want of jurisdiction because the parties seeking to appeal were not parties to the lawsuit on the date final
judgment was signed. 330 In Preston, the Prestons were nonsuited from
the original suit on July 16, 1996. 331 The trial court entered an order
granting a motion for partial summary judgment on November 1, 1996.332
Although the Prestons attempted to intervene on November 14, 1996, the
319. Id.
320. See id.
321. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 162. Rule 162 states, in pertinent part, that "[a]t any time
before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence, the
plaintiff may dismiss a case, or take a non-suit ....A dismissal under this rule shall have
no effect on any motion for sanctions ... pending at the time of dismissal." Id.
322. Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d 595.
323. See id. at 596.
324. Id.
325. 840 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, orig. proceeding).
326. See Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d at 596.
327. 822 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding).
328. See Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d at 596 n.2.
329. 948 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, n.w.h.).
330. See id. at 21.
331. See id. at 20.
332. See id.
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same date the trial court entered an order modifying its judgment, the
plea was filed after the original judgment had been entered and was,
therefore, untimely. 333 Thus, because the Prestons were not parties to the
3 34
final judgment, they had no standing to appeal.
Similarly, a party that has not intervened in a class action lawsuit prior
335
to judgment has no standing to file postjudgment motions or to appeal.
IX.

DISQUALIFICATION OF APPELLATE COURT JUDGES

In response to a "Motion to Recuse Judges of the Eighth Judicial District and any Judge Within a 200 Mile Radius" filed by a pro se appellant,
the El Paso Court of Appeals denied the motion without explanation but
with careful assurances that the court followed the procedures outlined in
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 15 and 18.336 Finding no authority
for the recusal of all judges within a 200 mile radius, however, the court
337
declined to even address this portion of the appellant's motion.
In a case of apparent first impression, the San Antonio Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether a party may object to the assignment
to the court of appeals of a former justice. 338 In Weidner, the Appellee,
Arthur Marlin, filed an objection in the court of appeals to the assignment of a former justice to the panel hearing his case. 33 9 The objection
was based on section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code, which provides for objections to assigned judges. The San Antonio court held that
the provision permitting a party to object to an assigned judge under section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code does not apply to the assignment of visiting appellate justices under section 75.003 of the
340
Government Code.
X. PERFECTION OF APPEAL
In Kunstoplast of America, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 341 the
342
Supreme Court held that Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(1)
343
and 41(a)(1)
do not preclude a nonlawyer from performing the ministerial act of depositing cash with a clerk in lieu of a cost bond on behalf of
333. See id. at 21.
334. See id.
335. See San Juan 1990-A, L.P. v. Meridian Oil Inc., 951 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
336. See Resendez v. Schwartz, 940 S.W.2d 714,714 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
337. See id. at 714 n. 1.
338. See Weidner v. Marlin, 937 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
339. See id. at 601.
340. See id. at 603.
341. 937 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
342. See TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(1). Rule 40(a)(1) states, in pertinent part, that "[w]hen
security for costs is required by law, the appeal is perfected when the bond, cash deposit or
affidavit in lieu thereof has been filed or made." Id.
343. See TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(1). Rule 41(a)(1) states, in pertinent part, that "[w]hen
security for costs on appeal is required, the bond ... shall be filed with the clerk within
thirty days after the judgment is signed .... If a deposit of cash is made in lieu of bond, the
same shall be made within the same period." Id.
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a corporation and an individual appellant. 344
In order to perfect their appeal, appellants Kunstoplast and Ashok
Chauhan arranged for Justin Seth, an officer of Kunstoplast and a nonlawyer, to file a cash deposit in lieu of cost bond for each of them. 345
"The court of appeals dismissed Kunstoplast's appeal, holding that only a
licensed attorney can represent a corporation. '346 The court of appeals
dismissed Chauhan's appeal "because he did not represent himself or appear by a licensed attorney as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
7."347

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals with respect to both
appellants, noting that Kunstoplast and Chauhan "made bona fide attempts to invoke the court of appeals' jurisdiction by having Seth file
their cash deposits in lieu of cost bonds. '348 The Supreme Court agreed
that, generally speaking, "a corporation may be represented only by a
licensed attorney ... and an individual must appear in person or by an
attorney. ' 349 Nonetheless, relying on its "'policy to construe rules reasonably but liberally... so that the right to appeal is not lost by creating a
requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the
rule,"' 350 the Supreme Court held that the "specific ministerial task" of
depositing cash in lieu of a cost bond may be performed by a
351
nonlawyer.
XI.

THE RECORD ON APPEAL

In Gallagher v. Fire Insurance Exchange,352 the Supreme Court followed its decision in Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Estate of Gonzalez353
and held that the court of appeals erred in denying, without a stated reason, the appellant pre-submission leave to supplement the statement of
facts. 3 54 Noting its holding in Crown Life that appellate courts must liberally construe Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 55(b), 355 the Supreme
344. See Kunstoplast, 937 S.W.2d at 456.
345. See id.
346. Id.
347. Id.; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 7. Rule 7 states that "[a]ny party to a suit may appear
and prosecute or defend his rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of the court."
Id.
348. Kunstoplast, 937 S.W.2d at 456.
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1993)).
351. Kunstoplast, 937 S.W.2d at 456.
352. 950 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
353. 820 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
354. See Gallagher,950 S.W.2d at 371.
355. See TEX. R. App. P. 55(b). Rule 55(b) states, in pertinent part:
If anything material to either party is omitted from the transcript or statement of facts, before submission[,] ... the appellate court, on a proper suggestion or on its own initiative, may direct a supplemental record to be
certified and transmitted by the clerk of the trial court or the official court
reporter supplying such omitted matter. The appellate court shall permit it
to be filed unless the supplementation will unreasonably delay disposition of
the appeal.
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Court held that the spirit of Rule 55(b) is offended when the court of
appeals affirms the trial court's judgment on the basis of items omitted
from the record after having denied pre-submission supplementation of
those items "without having determined
that such would unreasonably
356
delay disposition of the appeal.
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Vandiver,357 the court
of appeals addressed a situation in which the court reporter in a jury trial
omitted to take down verbatim and include in the statement of facts deposition testimony and exhibits read into the trial record. 358 After the appeal had been perfected and the record filed, the parties to the appeal
discovered that there were several omissions of testimony from the statement of facts and numerous discrepancies between the recollections of
counsel of trial testimony and what was contained in the statement of
facts. 359 The court of appeals abated the appeal to the trial court so that
the inaccuracies in the record could be corrected. 360 After the trial court
held a hearing, determined that the record could be corrected and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the record, the
appellant, State Farm, filed a motion in the court of appeals to strike the
361
supplemental statement of facts and to reverse and remand the case.
The court of appeals denied State Farm's motion, holding that the testimony and exhibits could be properly reconstructed from the court reporter's contemporaneous shorthand notes, the court reporter's audio
tape recording and the relevant exhibits and deposition excerpts that had
been read into the record but not transcribed. 362 In reaching its decision,
the Waco Court of Appeals retreated from its earlier contrary decision in
Home Insurance Co. v. Hambric,36 3 which was itself inconsistent with the
364
decisions of other courts of appeals on the question.
365
In Guerra v. Texas Departmentof Protectiveand Regulatory Services,
the court of appeals refused to consider an untimely tendered statement
of facts where the appellant had previously sought and obtained an extension of time for filing the statement of facts and then failed to make the
filing in accordance with the extension granted, even though appellant's
counsel stated that the failure to observe the court's deadlines was "due
to his not having a permanent secretary" and to a "termite problem he
was experiencing at home. '366 The court of appeals rejected appellant's
Id.
356. Gallagher,950 S.W.2d at 371.
357. 941 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
358. See id. at 345.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 349.
363. 906 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
364. See State Farm, 941 S.W.2d at 349. Accord Rogers v. CIGNA Ins. Co. of Tex., 881
S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v.
Hernandez, 804 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
365. 940 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
366. Id. at 297.
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argument that her constitutional rights of due process and equal protection were infringed by the court's refusal to allow her to submit the state367
ment of facts late.
In Sheerin v. Exxon Corp.,368 the court of appeals held that Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 54(a) 3 6 9 prevented the court from considering a
transcript tendered seventy-nine days late when the appellant did not file
a motion for extension of time. 370 In disposing of the appellant's argument that the district clerk improperly refused to prepare the transcript
because the clerk's computer erroneously showed that the judgment was
interlocutory, the court stated that even such an alleged "improper refusal... does not relieve appellants' burden to tender a timely transcript
or ... motion for extension of time to file the transcript." 37 1
In McDonald v. State,372 the Waco Court of Appeals held that the
"party appealing a directed verdict must ... bring forth the entire record
of the trial court proceedings to show error requiring reversal. '373 The
court's analysis considered Supreme Court precedents holding that harmful error on legal sufficiency points cannot be shown without a complete
record on appeal. 374 Specifically, the opinion focused on the correlation
between appellate review of directed verdicts and appellate review of
legal sufficiency challenges, noting that
because the possibility exists that evidence could be found anywhere
in the appellate record that would entitle a party to judgment as a
matter of law, we conclude that a party appealing a directed verdict
must, as in legal sufficiency cases, bring forth the entire record of the
trial court proceedings to show error requiring reversal. 375
In Bassett FurnitureIndustries, Inc. v. Texas State Bank,376 the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals held that, where original exhibits are lost and
the parties cannot agree that tendered copies of the exhibits sworn by the
court reporter to correspond to the original documents admitted into evidence are an adequate substitute, the appropriate remedy under Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(e) 3 7 7 is to abate the appeal and remand
the case to the trial court for a determination of whether copies may be
367. See id. at 298 (citing Krasniqi v. Dallas County Child Protective Servs. Unit of Tex.
Dep't of Human Servs., 809 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 1006 (1992)).
368. 939 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
369. See TEX. R. App. P. 54(a). Rule 54(a) states, in pertinent part, that "[tihe transcript . . . shall be filed in the appellate court within sixty days after the judgment is
signed .... The court has authority to consider all timely filed transcripts.., but shall have
no authority to consider a late filed transcript ... except as permitted by this rule." Id.
370. See Sheerin, 939 S.W.2d at 228-29.
371. Id. at 229 n.5.
372. 936 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
373. Id. at 737.
374. See id. at 736-37. See also Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991); Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1968).
375. McDonald, 936 S.W.2d at 737 (citing Schafer, 813 S.W.2d at 155; Kennedy, 428
S.W.2d at 807).
376. 951 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.) (per curiam).
377. See TEX. R. App. P. 50(e). Rule 50(e) states that

1998]

APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

substituted for the lost original exhibits. 378 The decision highlights a division among the courts of appeals on this issue, as it disagrees with holdings from certain other courts of appe'als that the appellant is entitled to
an automatic new trial without any resort to the trial court for determina379
tion of the substitution question.
In Soto v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,380 an appeal from a summary judgment, the El Paso Court of Appeals followed the Supreme court's decision in Silk v. Terrill,381 granting appellant's post-submission motion for
leave to file a supplemental transcript to include the appellee's motion for
partial summary judgment. 382 Despite the fact that the appellant had requested that the motion be included in the transcript, the appellee's transcript designation requested all items designated by the appellant, and the
appellee's appendix to its brief contained the motion. The appellee objected for the first time in a letter filed on the day of submission that this
defect in the record was fatal to the appeal. 38 3 The court of appeals disagreed and stated its view that appellee's "tardy" and "belated" objection
384
did not serve the interests of judicial economy.
385
In Feldman v. Marks, the Supreme Court took the admittedly extraordinary step of directing the district court to transmit to the clerk of
the Supreme Court for the Court's consideration a sealed transcript containing ex parte communications between the trial court and counsel for
the Office of Independent Counsel of the U.S. Government (OIC), even
though the transcript was never made part of the record in the court of
386
appeals.
The unusual facts of the case are useful in explaining the result. Marks,
a taxpayer, after being informed by the OIC that he may have failed to
file tax returns in certain years and that his tax returns in other years may
have been incorrect, attempted to obtain documents relating to the tax
returns from Feldman, his former accountant. 387 Feldman refused to coWhen the record or any portion thereof is lost or destroyed it may be substituted in the trial court and when so substituted the record may be prepared
and transmitted to the appellate court as in other cases. If the appellant has
made a timely request for a statement of facts, but the court reporter's notes
and records have been lost or destroyed without appellant's fault, the appellant is entitled to a new trial unless the parties agree on a statement of facts.
Id.
378. See Bassett Furniture, 951 S.W.2d at 11.
379. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Chatham, 899 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd); Hidalgo, Chambers & Co. v. FDIC, 790 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.Waco 1990, writ denied). But see First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); Hackney v. First State Bank of Honey
Grove, 866 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ); Adams v. Transportation Ins.
Co., 845 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
380. 942 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
381. 898 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1995).
382. See Soto, 942 S.W.2d at 645.
383. See id. at 644.
384. Id. at 645.
385. 960 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
386. See id. at 616.
387. See id.
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operate with Marks because of his own concerns about the OIC
388
investigation.
Worried that Feldman was in poor health, Marks successfully petitioned the district court for an order under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
187389 to obtain Feldman's deposition and documents. 390 Feldman
moved for reconsideration and, at the hearing, OIC counsel appeared
and argued for the order to be vacated on the grounds that the requested
discovery would interfere with an ongoing federal grand jury investigation. 391 Over Marks' objection, the court heard OIC counsel in chambers
for forty-five minutes, outside the presence of Marks and his counsel. 392
A transcript of the hearing was prepared, and Marks unsuccessfully
393
sought a copy.
Marks appealed the trial court's refusal to release the sealed transcript
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a. 394 The OIC argued on appeal
that the transcript was properly sealed, but the court of appeals disagreed, holding that the ex parte hearing violated "'both the United
States and Texas Constitutions, Texas rules and case law.' 395 The United
396
States then applied for a writ of error.
The Supreme Court recognized that the sealed transcript was not in the
appellate record, and that "Marks learned of [its] omission while the case
was pending in the court of appeals but did not move to supplement the
397
record" to include it.
The Supreme Court also recognized that it was
Marks' burden under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(d) 3 9 8 to
present a sufficient record on appeal to show reversible error and that,
without the sealed transcript, the Supreme Court (as well as the court of
appeals before it) "was obliged to presume" that the transcript contained
388. See id.
389. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 187. Rule 187 states, in pertinent part:
When any person may anticipate the institution of an action in which he may
be a party, and may desire to perpetuate his own testimony or that of any
other person to be used in such suit, he, his agent or attorney, may file a
verified petition in the proper court of any county where venue of the anticipated action may lie ....If satisfied that the perpetuation of testimony may
prevent a failure or delay of justice, the court or justice shall make an order
authorizing the taking of such depositions ....Any interested party may...
move to suppress said deposition ....
Id. at 187(1), (4).
390. See Feldman, 960 S.W.2d at 615.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a. Rule 76a states, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny order ...
relating to sealing or unsealing court records shall be deemed to be severed from the case
and a final judgment which may be appealed by any party or intervenor who participated
in the hearing preceding issuance of such order." Id. at 76a(8).
395. Feldman, 960 S.W.2d at 616 (quoting Marks v. Feldman, 910 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1995)).
396. See id.
397. Id.
398. See TEX. R. App. P. 50(d). Rule 50(d) states, in pertinent part, that "[tihe burden
is on the appellant ... to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring
reversal." Id.
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secret grand jury information as the United States contended. 399
Nonetheless, relying on the language of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 51(d), 400 the Supreme Court held that:
As we have said, the burden is ordinarily on the appellant-in this
case Marks-to present a complete record in an unrestricted appeal,
and appellant's failure to discharge this burden ordinarily results in
presumptions against appellant's position. We do not question the
wisdom of this rule, but in extraordinary cases-as this one certainly
is-the appellate court must have residual authority to complete the
40
record to assure that justice is done. '
Justice Gonzalez, dissenting from the majority opinion, complained that
the majority opinion established no guidelines for when the appellate
court will order supplementation of the record on its own initiative. 402
In S.H. v. National Convenience Stores, Inc.,403 the court of appeals
affirmed the judgment below because the appellant failed to provide a
complete statement of facts. 40 4 The decision reiterated the established
rule that a party seeking reversal based on the exclusion of testimony
must present the entire statement of facts for the appellate court to review. A successful evidentiary challenge requires the appellant to show
that "the judgment depends on the particular evidence excluded. ' 40 5
In Baker v. Trand, Inc.,406 the Waco Court of Appeals allowed the appellants to supplement the statement of facts with testimony and exhibits,
even though they had previously requested the court reporter to omit the
evidence from the statement of facts. The appellants requested supplementation only after the appellees' brief argued that the failure to bring
forward a complete statement of facts was fatal to each point of error. 40 7
The rationale for the decision is two-fold. First, the court held that "omitted" testimony under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 55(b) 40 8 means
"'missing' without any consideration of the scienter involved. '40 9 Second, the court held that the burden of showing unreasonable delay rests
on the party resisting supplementation, and that the appellees did not
meet their burden merely by showing that they would have to rewrite the
appellees' brief in light of the record supplementation. 4 10
In French v. Kopecky, 4 11 the court of appeals held that the pendency of
399. Feldman, 960 S.W.2d at 617.
400. See TEX. R. App. P. 51(d). Rule 51(d) states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he appellate court on its own initiative may direct the clerk of the court below to send to it any
original paper or exhibit for its inspection." Id.
401. Feldman, 960 S.W.2d at 617.
402. See id. at 618.
403. 936 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1996, no writ).
404. See id. at 408.
405. Id. at 408.
406. 931 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ).
407. See id. at 406.
408. See TEX. R. App. P. 55(b).
409. Baker, 931 S.W.2d at 407.
410. See id.
411. 931 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1996, writ denied).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

a successful mandamus proceeding overruling a contest to the appellant's
affidavit of inability to pay costs on appeal does not toll the time period
for filing the transcript. Consequently, the appellant's failure to timely
of time to file the transcript requires the disfile or request an extension
41 2
missal of the appeal.
XII. THE BRIEF ON APPEAL
In Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University,413 the Supreme Court
considered an appellant's argument that the application of the sovereign
immunity doctrine violates the Open Courts and Due Course of Law
Clauses of the Texas Constitution 414 despite the appellant's failure to
brief the Due Course of Law argument. 4 15 Acknowledging that Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 74(f) states that a party generally waives the
claimed error if he does not brief it,416 the Court noted that "when fact
issues are not germane to the issue on appeal, and the issue is a law question involving constitutional ramifications," the importance of the issue to
the State's jurisprudence justifies the Court's review of the issue on the
merits. 417
XIII.

FRIVOLOUS APPEALS

In In re Marriageof Long,4 18 the court of appeals awarded the appellee
sanctions against the appellant in the amount of 4.5 times the court costs
under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 84.419 The court found that the
appeal from an agreed judgment based on a settlement agreement signed
and filed of record, in which the parties dismissed their respective claims
against each other and waived the right to appeal from any existing order,
was done for the purposes of delay, even'4 20though the appellant "subjectively expected to prevail in his appeal.
XIV.

MOOT APPEALS

In City of Alamo v. Montes,421 the Texas Supreme Court dismissed as
412. See id. at 35.
413. 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997).
414. See TEX. CONS'. art. I, § 19.
415. FederalSign, 951 S.W.2d at 409-10.
416. See TEX. R. App. P. 74(f) (1997, superseded by TEX. R. App. P. 38 (1998)). See
also Leyva v. Leyva, 960 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ) (applying Rule 74
to affirm trial court's judgment without review on the merits where appellant failed to
assign any points of error or provide any authorities for his arguments).
417. Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 410.
418. 946 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no writ).
419. See id. at 100; see also TEX. R. App. P. 84. Rule 84 states, in pertinent part:
In civil cases where the court of appeals shall determine that an appellant has
taken an appeal for delay and without sufficient cause, then the court may, as
part of its judgment, award each prevailing appellee an amount not to exceed
ten ... times the total taxable costs as damages against such appellant.
Id.
420. In re Marriage of Long, 946 S.W.2d at 99.
421. 934 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. 1996).
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moot an appeal from an injunction requiring the city to reinstate Ms.
Montes as city secretary after she resigned her position. 422 In contrast,
the San Antonio Court of Appeals denied a defendant's motion to dismiss as moot a suit by the Texas Department of Public Safety to suspend
the defendant's license based on a DWI charge despite the fact that the
DWI charge had been dismissed. 423 Because the dismissal of the DWI
charge 4 did not constitute an acquittal, the court refused to dismiss the
42
case.
XV.
A.

SPECIAL APPEALS
THE LIMITED APPEAL

In Casey v. Casey,42 5 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals dismissed a limited appeal at the appellant's request, despite the appellee's
argument that she intended to raise cross-points. The court noted that in
order to preserve issues for review by the appellate court in response to a
limited appeal, appellee needed to file her own notice of appeal, rather
failed to file a notice of apthan rely on cross-points. 426 Since appellee 427
peal, the court dismissed the limited appeal.
B.

APPEAL BY WRIT OF ERROR

"'[T]o be entitled to reversal by writ of error, a party who did not participate at trial has six months [from the date of the judgment] in which to
show error on the face of the record."'' 4 28 The appellate court considers
"all papers on file in the appeal, including the statement of facts," when
429
making the determination.
In Bloom, a writ of error appeal from a default judgment in a divorce
case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that "the acceptance-ofbenefits doctrine applies in equitable bill of review proceedings, as well as
direct appeals," even when the bill of review is grounded on defective
service. 4 30 Finding that the appellant had accepted benefits under the
challenged divorce decree, including her share of the community estate,
relief from community debts, and court-ordered child support, the court
422. See id. at 86.
423. See Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Stacy, 954 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1997, n.w.h.).
424. See id. at 82.
425. No. 14-96-01043-CV, 1997 WL 441872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 7,
1997, pet. filed).
426. See id. at *2. Cf TEX. R. App. P. 25.1(c) (effective September 1, 1997).
427. See Casey, 1997 WL 441872, at *2.

428. Bloom v. Bloom, 935 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ)
(quoting Primate Constr. Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994)).
429. Id. (citing DSC Fin. Corp. v. Moffitt, 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1991)).
430. Id. at 945-946 (citing Newman v. Link, 889 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex. 1994)). See also
Carle v. Carle, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (Tex. 1950) ("A litigant cannot treat a judgment as
both right and wrong, and if he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a judgment, he

cannot afterward prosecute an appeal therefrom.").
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dismissed the appeal. 431 The court held that the appellant's acceptance of
substantial benefits estopped her from pursuing the merits of her appeal
432
from the divorce decree.
In Rosas v. Diaz,433 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
failure of the petition for writ of error to identify adversely interested
parties as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45(c) 434 was
not a jurisdictional defect and would not justify dismissal. 435 Relying on
its prior decisions in Palacios v. Harris436 and Molina v. Negley,43 7 as well
as the Supreme Court's decision in Grand Prairie Independent School
District v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc.,438 the court held that Rosas
timely filed his petition for writ of error "in a bona fide attempt to perfect
his appeal" and, thereby, properly invoked the court's jurisdiction. 439
In Greenstreet v. Heiskell,440 the court of appeals dismissed the petition
for writ of error from an adverse summary judgment clearing title to real
property and lifting purported crop liens. The court held that pro se petitioner Greenstreet, an apparent adherent of the "Republic of Texas"
movement, had "participated" in the trial of the case within the meaning
of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45(b) 44 1 by filing among other
things, a response to the summary judgment motion. 442
In C & V Club v. Gonzalez,44 3 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
denied a petition for writ of error based on the fact that defense counsel
431. See Bloom 935 S.W.2d at 949.
432. See id. at 947-49. The court of appeals, while correctly noting that the acceptanceof-benefits doctrine could not estop appellant from complaining that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to determine child visitation and custody, child support, and the
division of marital property, nonetheless denied relief on the basis that appellant failed to
show error on the face of the record. See id. at 949.
433. 940 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
434. See TEX. R. App. P. 45(c). Rule 45(c) states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he petition
shall state the names and residences of the parties adversely interested." Id.
435. See Rosas, 940 S.W.2d at 255.
436. 715 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
437. 425 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ).
438. 813 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1991).
439. Rosas, 940 S.W.2d at 255.
440. 940 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ).
441. See TEX. R. App. P. 45(B). Rule 45(b) states that "No party who participates either
in person or by his attorney in the actual trial of the case in the trial court shall be entitled
to review by the court of appeals through means of writ of error." Id.
442. See Greenstreet, 940 S.W.2d at 834. In response to the original petition, Greenstreet had filed a document titled '"CORRECTED' NOTICE OF NO VENUE OR JURISDICTION NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO ACCEPT FOR CAUSE WITHOUT
DISHONOR PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL PETITION" and a document titled "DEMAND
FOR QUALIFICATION AS DE JURE JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF
THE DE JURE JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE TEXAS STATE OF THE UNION, PURSUANT TO THE PREAMBLE AND
THE TEXAS ENABLING ACT." Id. at 832. The court noted that these documents,
which "purported to be issued by 'Republic of Texas, Our One Supreme Court, Common
Law Venue; Original Jurisdiction Exclusive to the People, A Superior court Sitting with the
Power of a Circuit and United States District Court, in and for Dallam county, Texas Republic, United States of America,"' requested affirmative relief and constituted a general
appearance in the case. Id. at 832 n.1.
443. 953 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
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appeared at the sanctions hearing at which a default judgment was entered without the defendant, Mercado. Then, at a later hearing on damages, counsel unsuccessfully requested a continuance to locate his client
and cross-examined the witnesses on actual damages. 444 Participation by
counsel in a dispositive hearing, even though not literally "participation
45(b), 445 "is sufficient
at trial" under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
446
to make appeal by writ of error unavailable.
In Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd.,44 7 a petition for writ of error proceeding
challenging a decree ordering the partition of real property, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals observed that a partition case produces two
appealable orders or judgments: the decree ordering partition and "the
partition decree itself, in which the trial court actually partitions the property. '' 448 The petition for writ of error did not specifically identify the
challenged decree, and it would have been untimely filed if directed to
the decree ordering partition rather than the partition decree. 449 The
court nonetheless held that representations of counsel in the appellant's
brief that "'[t]here is no dispute that the petition was filed within six
months of the signing of the final judgment"' were sufficient to establish
that the petition challenged the later decree and was timely. 450 However,
because it
the error alleged in the petition was not reviewable precisely
45 1
did not challenge the earlier decree ordering partition.
C.

BILL OF REVIEW

An equitable bill of review proceeding is an independent action
brought by a party to a former action, seeking to set aside a final judgment that is no longer subject to a motion for new trial, appeal, or writ of
error. The movant must ordinarily show "that he had a meritorious claim
or defense; ... that he was prevented from asserting his claim or defense
by the fraud, accident, or mistake of the opposing party;" and that he is
free from "any fault or negligence of his own."'452 However, a party who
did not receive actual notice of pending litigation need not show that he
had a meritorious defense or that he was prevented from asserting it in
453
order to seek a bill of review.
444. See id. at 757.
445. See TEx. R. App. P. 45(B). See also footnote 420, supra.
446. C & V Club, 953 S.W.2d at 757 ("A party participates by taking some part,
whether personally or through counsel, in the decision-making event producing final judgment adjudicating his rights." (emphasis added)).
447. 951 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
448. Id. at 823-24.
449. See id. at 824.
450. Id.
451. See id.
452. Caldwell v. Barnes, 941 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ
granted) (citing Ortega v. First Republic Bank, Fort Worth, N.A., 792 S.W.2d 452, 453
(Tex. 1990); Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950)).
453. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988); Lopez v. Lopez, 757
S.W.2d 721 (Tex. 1988).
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In Caldwell, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed the novel
question of "whether a party who did not receive actual notice of a suit
before entry of the default still needs to be diligent in exhausting his legal
remedies against the judgment" (in a jurisdiction other than Texas)
before bringing a bill of review action in Texas. 454
Barnes sued Caldwell, a Colorado resident, in 1989, alleging claims
arising from business dealings in Texas. 455 Barnes unsuccessfully attempted service on Caldwell by certified mail and then arranged for personal service in Colorado by a private process server, who filed an
affidavit (which he later contradicted) stating that he personally served
Caldwell on July 30, 1989.456 Caldwell never answered, and a fifteen mil-

lion dollar default judgment was entered against him on December 6,
7
1989.

45

Barnes domesticated the default judgment in Colorado on September
24, 1991, pursuant to the Colorado Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act. 458 Caldwell alleged that the first time he learned of the

Texas judgment was on or about September 24, 1991, when he received
notice of the domestication of the judgment in Colorado. 459 Although
Caldwell could have done so, he did not contest either the service in the
underlying Texas case or the domestication at that time.460 Caldwell's
answer to Barnes' June 15, 1992, Colorado civil action to find and recover
assets to enforce the domesticated judgment also did not contest service

of process in the underlying Texas suit.46 1 Caldwell argued, instead, that
the property Barnes sought to acquire did not belong to him. 46 2

In May of 1993, Caldwell located the Texas process server, "who admitted that he never... served [Caldwell] in the underlying case."'463 At that
point, almost nineteen months after being put on notice of the default,
Caldwell filed a motion in the Colorado enforcement suit attacking the
domesticated judgment. 464 In response, Barnes filed an action in Hidalgo
County, Texas, seeking a declaratory judgment validating the original default judgment. 465 "[Caldwell] answered this suit, and filed a petition for
bill of review and injunction in the same court ....

underlying default judgment set aside.

'46 6

seeking to have the

Caldwell and Barnes moved

454. Caldwell, 941 S.W.2d at 187 ("The parties have not cited any authority, and we
have found none, which addresses a situation in which a party who has had other legal
remedies available to contest a default judgment besides the Texas remedies, fails to pursue them." (emphasis in original)).
455. See id. at 184.
456. See id.

457. See id.

458. See id.; COLO.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See

466. Id.

REV. STAT. ANN.

Caldwell, 941 S.W.2d at 185.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

§§ 13-53-101 et seq. (West 1989).
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for summary judgment on the petition for bill of review, and Barnes
467
prevailed.
On appeal, Caldwell argued that the default was void as a matter of law
for lack of service. 468 Barnes contended that Caldwell negligently failed
to attack the default in Colorado when he first learned
of it and that, as a
469
result, was estopped to attack it by bill of review.
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment against Caldwell,
stating:
We do not construe his "legal remedies" as encompassing only Texas
remedies. Rather, when the Texas judgment was domesticated in
Colorado, appellant had legal remedies available which he declined
to pursue. He chose not to contest the Texas court's jurisdiction at
that point, either in Colorado or in Texas. Instead, he chose to treat
the judgment as valid. Thus, appellant failed as a matter of law to
meet his only requirement towards bringing a bill of review; he failed
470
to show that he was not negligent in pursuing his legal remedies.
In Pursley v. Ussery,471 a bill of review proceeding to reopen a property
division entered in a divorce action, the 57th District Court of Bexar
County reformed the retirement benefits provisions in a divorce decree
entered by the 224th District Court. 472 The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed and rendered, holding that the 224th District Court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the bill of review because it was not the court that
had entered the original divorce decree. 473 In addition, although the
court of appeals considered the bill of review to be a collateral attack on
the decree instead of a direct attack, the court of appeals held that the
relief granted by the 224th District Court was still erroneous because
there was no pleading or trial court finding that the original decree was
void.

474

In Subsequent Injury Fund, State of Texas v. Service Lloyds Insurance
the court of appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal
by the Subsequent Injury Fund (the Fund) from a summary judgment
dismissing the Fund's equitable bill of review on the basis that "the legal
remedy of writ of error was available. '47 6 Acknowledging that appellee
Lloyds contended for the first time on rehearing that the Fund lacked
standing to bring a bill of review because it was not a party to the underlying suit, the court found that "the underlying judgment [was] void and
unenforceable against [the Fund] because [the Fund] was never made a
Co.,475

467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 189-90.
937 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
See id. at 567.
See id. at 568.
See id.
961 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
Id. at 675.
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party to the underlying suit."'477
D.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS

A significant number of cases in the courts of appeal during the Survey
period address procedural questions related to appeals from administrative agencies. Because each administrative agency is governed by its own
enabling legislation, appellate timetables and procedures are often uncertain. Courts determine which law governs appellate deadlines based on
the express language in the statutes enabling the agency to review
complaints.
1. Administrative ProcedureAct v. Agency Regulations
a.

Appeals from Agency Proceedings Governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act

Faced with conflicting procedural rules regarding when to file a motion
for rehearing in an administrative proceeding, the Austin Court of Appeals in Mednick v. Texas State Board of Public Accountancy,478 favored
the time lines established in the Administrative Procedure Act over the
agency regulations. 479 In Mednick, Mednick filed his motion for rehearing before the Board of Public Accountancy twenty days after the Board
mailed its order. 480 Under section 22(f) of the Texas Public Accountancy
Act, 481 Mednick had only fifteen days to file his motion for rehearing, but
he had twenty days pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 482 The district court dismissed Mednick's petition for judicial review on the grounds that his motion for rehearing was late. 483 The Austin
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that, because Accountancy Act specifically incorporated the APA, which "provides the minimum standards for judicial review of agency decisions," the
twenty day time period under the APA governed the time for filing
484
Mednick's motion for rehearing.
b.

Appeals from Agency Proceedings Not Governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act

The Dallas Court of Appeals declined to apply the Administrative Procedure Act to determine which party had the burden of bringing forth the
record from the administrative proceedings for review by the appellate
477. Id. at 680.
478. 933 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
479. See id. at 338.
480. See id. at 337.
481. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 41a, §§ 1-32 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
482. See Mednick, 933 S.W.2d at 337; TEX. Govr CODE ANN. § 2001.146(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1998).
483. See Mednick, 933 S.W.2d at 337.
484. Id. at 338-39. See also Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Lavender, 935 S.W.2d 925,929
(Tex. App.-Waco 1996, writ denied) (holding that APA applies to proceedings arising out
of a driver's license suspension).
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court. 485 Instead, the court found that administrative proceedings related
to the Dallas Urban Review Board were governed by section 214.0012 of
the Texas Local Government Code, which is the enabling statute for the
relevant Dallas City Code provision. 486 The court reasoned that under
section 214.0012 of the Texas Local Government Code, the party appealing from the agency's ruling must do so by requesting the issuance of a
writ of certiorari, placing the duty upon the petitioner to obtain the administrative record. 48 7 By failing to meet this burden, petitioner was left
488
without a record from the administrative proceedings.
2. The Record
In Texas Health Enterprises,Inc. v. Texas Department of Human Services,489 the Texas Supreme Court held that the record from an administrative proceeding is part of the appellate record, despite the failure of
either party to admit the record as evidence before the trial court, where
the administrative record was filed with the trial court, both parties used
the record in arguing before the trial court and the trial court relied on
the record in reaching its conclusions. 490 The Court based its decision on
the longstanding rule that "evidence that is not objected to and that the
trial court and the parties treat as admitted is, for all practical purposes,
'49 1
admitted.
3. Motions for Rehearing Before the Agency
As a general rule, in administrative proceedings, a party must raise
each ground of error in a motion for rehearing before the administrative
agency to be able to raise the issue in the trial court. In Central Power &
Light Co. v. Sharp,492 the Supreme Court noted that this general rule
does not apply where the agency lacks authority to decide the issue raised
in the trial court. Thus, because the State Comptroller of Public Accounts lacks authority to decide the issue of whether the underlying statute relied upon by the agency is unconstitutional, a motion for rehearing
before the agency is unnecessary on this issue in order to raise the argu4 93
ment in the trial court.
4.

Timeliness of Petition for Review by Trial Court

In reviewing a trial court's jurisdiction to hear a petition for judicial
review from a final decision of the State Office of Administrative Hearings, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a petitioner's appeal was un485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

See Nussbaum v. City of Dallas, 948 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
See id. at 307.
See id. at 307-308.
See id. at 308.
949 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
See id. at 313-14.
Id. at 314.
960 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1997).
See id. at 620.
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timely when its petition never reached the district clerk's office, though
timely mailed. 494 The court noted that when petitions are mailed, "the
cautious practitioner would benefit by making doubly sure that the clerk
actually receives a copy. . . ,,495 Because the attorneys in P.R.LD.E.
failed to exercise any diligence to verify that the petition timely reached
the court, the court would not
apply any equitable remedies to extend the
496
petition.
the
filing
for
time
5. Scope of Review
Appeals from agency decisions are limited. In Texas Department of
Transportationv. T. Brown Constructors, Inc. 497 the Austin Court of Appeals held that a trial court erred by rendering judgment for a party in a
different amount than the agency's decision. The court reasoned that
although a trial court has the legislative authority to review an agency's
decision, substituting its own discretion for that of the agency's "usurp[s]
the septhe agency's [statutory] authority and discretion" and "violate[s]
'498
aration-of-powers provision of the Texas Constitution.
XVI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

A summary judgment that contains a Mother Hubbard clause 499 or
other language purporting to dispose of all claims or parties is final and
appealable even if the order grants more relief than requested. 500 The
Supreme Court explained in Mafrige:
If a summary judgment order appears to be final, as evidenced by the
inclusion of language purporting to dispose of all claims or parties,
the judgment should be treated as final for purposes of appeal. If the
judgment grants more relief than requested, it should be reversed
and remanded, but not dismissed. We think this rule to be practical
in application and effect; litigants should be able to recognize a judgbe able
ment which on its face purports to be final, and courts should
50 1
to treat such a judgment as final for purposes of appeal.
494. See P.R.I.D.E. v. Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 950 S.W.2d 175, 176-77
(Tex. App.-Austin 1997, n.w.h.) (petition arrived at district court fifty-six days after the
deadline set forth in the APA and forty-five days after the grace period provided for in
other cases).
495. Id. at 177.
496. See id.
497. 947 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied).
498. Id. at 660.
499. "A Mother Hubbard clause generally recites that all relief not expressly granted is
denied." Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 590 n.1 (Tex. 1993); Bandera Elec. Co-op., Inc.
v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336, 336 n.1 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). "Clauses stating that the
summary judgment is granted as to all claims asserted by plaintiff, or that plaintiff takes
nothing against the defendant are the functional equivalent of a Mother Hubbard clause."
Id.
500. See Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam)
(citing Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 590).
501. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592.
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As reflected in Inglish, this rule can have a harsh result. In that case,
the plaintiff bank filed two motions for summary judgment on the defendant Inglish's counterclaims against the bank. 50 2 The first motion for sum50 3
mary judgment addressed only three of Inglish's six counterclaims.
The trial court granted the first motion, stating in its order that "'[the
bank] is entitled to summary judgment in this case' and that Inglish
should 'take nothing on account of his lawsuit against [the Bank].' Inglish
did not appeal this order. '50 4 The second motion, which addressed Inglish's remaining claims, was granted by the trial court almost five months
the second order granting sumlater. 50 5 The court of appeals50 reviewed
6
mary judgment and affirmed.
50 7
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
Under the rule stated in Mafrige, the Court held, Inglish was required to
appeal the first grant of summary judgment because it appeared on its
face to be final. 50 8 Contrary to the conclusion of the court of appeals,
Mafrige did not merely institute "a presumption of finality when a summary judgment purporting to be final is presented for appellate review." 50 9 Rather, under Mafrige, if a summary judgment order appears
to be final, the judgment should be treated as final for purposes of
510
appeal.
Under facts similar to those of Inglish, the First District Court of Appeals in Kaigler v. GeneralElectric Mortgage InsuranceCorp.511 acknowledged that, under the rule of Mafrige and Inglish, "a party now runs the
risk of waiving its appeal if it incorrectly believes that the summary judgment is interlocutory. ' 512 To avoid waiver, the nonmovant confronted
with a summary judgment order granting more relief than requested must
either (1) request the trial court to correct the erroneous summary judgment while the court retains plenary power over its judgment, or (2) perfect a timely appeal. 513 If the nonmovant does neither, the erroneous
summary judgment becomes final and unappealable. 514 The court noted,
however, that the "harshness of this . . . result is counterbalanced by a
and Inglish will ensalutary effect: uniform enforcement of Mafrige
515
courage attentiveness to correct judgments.
502. See Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 810.
503. See id. at 811.
504. Id.
505. See id.
506. See id.
507. See id.
508. See id.
509. Id.
510. See id.
511. 961 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
512. Id. at 279.
513. See id.; see also Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811.
514. Kaigler, 1997 WL 297591, at *4.
515. See id. The majority in Kaigler rejected the dissent's attempt to distinguish the
case at bar, which involved a summary judgment order containing a Mother Hubbard
clause purporting to dispose of parties not mentioned in the order, from the facts of
Mafrige, which "[dealt] with the impact of Mother Hubbard language on unresolved issues
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If, as Mafrige and Inglish dictate, a summary judgment that grants
more relief than requested is to be treated as final for purposes of appeal
what is the proper appellate disposition of such a summary judgment?
The Supreme Court considered this question in Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Gilchrist516 and Page v. Geller,517 and concluded that the
court of appeals must treat the judgment as any other final judgment. "It
is to consider all matters raised on appeal and reverse only those portions
of the judgment that were rendered in error." 518 Of course, "it is well
established that it is reversible error to grant summary judgment on519a
cause of action not addressed in the motion [for summary judgment].
Along these same lines, the Supreme Court in Science Spectrum, Inc. v.
Martinez520 affirmed the rule of McConnell v. Southside Independent
School District5 2 1 that "[a] motion for summary judgment must itself expressly present the grounds upon which it is made, and must stand or fall
on these grounds alone. '522 The Court stressed that, "in determining
[a court] may not rely on briefs
whether grounds are expressly presented,
'523
or summary judgment evidence.
In Science Spectrum, the plaintiff alleged that his injuries were caused
either by Science Spectrum's control of the premises on which he was
injured or by Science Spectrum's creation of the dangerous condition that
injured him. 524 Science Spectrum asserted: "the uncontradicted summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that SCIENCE
SPECTRUM, INC. did not control nor have a... duty to control the area
-525 The majority of the Court held that
where the accident occurred .
this allegation failed to address the plaintiff's claim that Science Spectrum
had created a dangerous condition. 526 Because it failed to raise this
ground in its motion, the Court held that Science Spectrum was not enti527
tled to summary judgment on the claim.
The dissent "fail[ed] to see what more Science Spectrum could have
argued to challenge [the plaintiff's] claim that it created a dangerous condition. ' 528 According to the dissent, the majority "reads Science Specbetween parties, rather than the disposition as to the parties themselves." Id. at 218 (emphasis added). The majority maintained that "[i]ssues and parties ... are codependent:
one could not exist without the other." Id. "If an order disposes of all issues in a case,
then it necessarily disposes of all parties to a case, and vice versa." Id.
516. 946 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
517. 941 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
518. Id. at 102 (citing Bandera, 946 S.W.2d at 377).
519. Granada Biosciences, Inc. v. Barrett, 958 S.W.2d 215, 221 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1997, pet. filed) (citing Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 591).
520. 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1997).
521. 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993).
522. Science Spectrum, 941 S.W.2d at 912 (citing McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 341).

523. Id.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

See id. at 910.
Id. at 913 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
See id. at 912.
See id.
Id. at 913 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
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trum's motion with too narrow a vision." 52 9
Also applying the rule of McConnell, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
in McKillip v. Employers Fire Insurance Co. 530 similarly refused to affirm
a summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's
negligence and DTPA claims because these claims were not mentioned or
addressed in the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 531 Rejecting
the defendant's argument that, by failing to except to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff waived any error in the defendant's failure to raise the negligence and DTPA claims, the court of
appeals quoted McConnell, stating, "When a motion for summary judgment asserts grounds A and B, it cannot be upheld on grounds C and D,
which were not asserted, even if the summary judgment proof532supports
them and the responding party did not except to the motion."
Similarly, a summary judgment cannot be upheld on grounds stated in
an accompanying brief, even if the brief is wholly incorporated into the
motion for summary judgment. 533 Thus, as the defendant in CoastalCement Sand Inc. v. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc.534 learned the hard
way, affirmative defenses raised in a Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment cannot be addressed on appeal in
determining whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. 535 Only the ground expressly stated in the motion can be
536
considered on appeal.
529. Id.
530. 932 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
531. See id. at 271.
532. Id. (citing McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 342). See also Garner v. Corpus Christi Nat'l
Bank, 944 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.) (summary judgment
in favor of defendant improper on plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims
where defendant did not move for summary judgment on those claims); Granada Biosciences, Inc. v. Barrett, 958 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. filed) (summary
judgment on claim for business disparagement improper where defendant did not move for
summary judgment on that claim).
533. See Coastal Cement Sand Inc. v. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc., 956 S.W.2d
562, 566 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
534. 956 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
535. See id. at 566.
536. See id. In refusing to consider grounds raised in a brief accompanying the motion
for summary judgment, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals refused to follow Howell
v. Murray Mortgage Co., 890 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). See id.
In Howell, the Amarillo court declared, "our reading of McConnell convinces us that
grounds found in a brief that is incorporated into a summary judgment motion should be
deemed as being presented in the motion." Howell, 890 S.W.2d at 85. The Coastal Cement
court concluded that "[t]he result in Howell appears to contradict the mandate in McConnell." CoastalCement, 956 S.W.2d at 566. As noted by the concurrence in Coastal Cement,
McConnell made it "crystal clear" that "grounds not contained in a motion for summary
judgment, but only incorporated by reference, [cannot] be considered in support of the
motion." Id. at 572-73 (Fowler, J., concurring). The concurrence, however, disagreed with
the majority's reading of Howell, noting that "[t]he issue in Howell was whether the court
could consider grounds contained in the same document as the motion [for summary judgment] but placed under a different-numbered paragraph than the paragraph containing the
motion." Id. at 573. The concurrence pointed out that, in contrast to Howell, "[t]he issue
in McConnell was whether a court could consider grounds in support of a motion for summary judgment when those grounds were contained in a separate document or contained
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REVIEW OF AMBIGUOUS ORDERS

In MacGregor v. Rich, 537 the trial court entered an ambiguous order
dismissing the plaintiff's lawsuit. 538 The order "reasonably could be understood either as a sanctions order under [a local rule of the court] or as
a dismissal for want of prosecution. ' 539 The court of appeals interpreted
for want of prosecution,
the dismissal as a sanction rather than a dismissal
5 40
and reversed the case for abuse of discretion.
Disagreeing with the analysis of the court of appeals, the Texas
Supreme Court held that, "[w]hen an ambiguous order is susceptible to
two reasonable constructions, an appellate court should adopt the construction that correctly applies the law."'541 According to the Supreme
Court, "when construed as a dismissal for want of prosecution based on
lack of diligence," the trial court's order "[did] not amount to an abuse of
discretion. '5 4 2 "The court of appeals," concluded the Supreme Court,
"should have adopted that construction [of the order] and affirmed the
'543
dismissal [of the case].
C.

REVIEW OF BATSON/EDMONSON CHALLENGES

In Goode v. Shoukfeh, 544 the Texas Supreme Court analyzed appellate
review of the trial court's rulings on Batson/Edmonson545 challenges to
peremptory strikes. In doing so, the Court set forth the three-step process used to resolve an objection that a peremptory challenge is based on
race. 546 According to the Court, the opponent of the peremptory chal547
lenge must first establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
Second, the burden shifts and the party exercising the strike must come
forward with a race-neutral explanation. 548 At this stage of the process,
the appellate court is not to consider "whether the explanation offered is
in evidence attached to the summary judgment motion." Id. In the concurrence's opinion,
Howell had "no significance to the appeal before this Court because this appeal involve[d]
a McConnell situation-grounds and defenses not contained in the motion and discussed
only in a separate document from the motion." Id.
537. 941 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
538. See id. at 75.
539. Id.
540. See id. at 75-76.
541. Id. at 75.
542. Id. at 76.
543. Id.
544. 943 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. 1997).
545. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a criminal defendant is
denied equal protection under the U.S. Constitution if a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to exclude members of the jury panel solely on the basis that their race is the same
as the defendant's); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending
Batson to civil trials). See also Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. 1991)
(holding that the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror on the basis of race
violates the equal protection rights of the excluded juror).
546. See Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445.
547. See id.
548. See id.

19981

APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

persuasive or even plausible. '549 Rather, "[i]n evaluating whether the explanation offered is race-neutral," the court of appeals must assume "the
reasons for the peremptory challenge are true" and "determine whether
the . . . challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of
law."5 50 Only at the third step of the process does the persuasiveness of
551
the justification for the strike becomes relevant.
At the third step, "the trial court may believe or not believe the explanation offered by the party [exercising the peremptory strike]. 552 At this
point, whether the explanation should be believed is a question of fact for
the trial court.553 The trial court's decision in this regard is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, which "is similar ... to the federal
standard of 'clearly erroneous.' ''554 A reviewing court, however, "will not
be bound by a finding of no discrimination under either our abuse of
discretion standard or the clearly erroneous standard if the justification
offered for striking a potential juror is 'simply too incredible to be
accepted."' 5 55
D.

No

EVIDENCE REVIEW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court discussed at length
556
the concepts set forth in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson
concerning no evidence review of expert testimony. Specifically, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Havner,557 the Supreme Court analyzed
whether the plaintiffs' evidence of causation presented by well-recognized experts "[was] scientifically reliable and thus some evidence to support the judgment in their favor. '558 Recognizing the well-established
rules for reviewing no evidence points, the Court stated that
[iln determining whether there is no evidence of probative force to
support a jury's finding, all the record evidence must be considered
in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has
been rendered, and every reasonable inference deducible from the
evidence is to be indulged in that party's favor. 55 9
The Court held that a no evidence point will be sustained
when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b)
the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight
to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence
offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d)
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. See id.
552. Id. at 445-46.
553. See id. at 446.
554. Id.
555. Id. The concurrence objected to the majority's "refusal to adopt the 'clearly erroneous' standard of reviewing a Batson/Edmonson challenge." Id. at 453 (Gonzalez, J.,
concurring).
556. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
557. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
558. Id. at 711.
559. Id.
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the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. 560
An "expert's bare opinion" regarding the existence of a vital fact, however, does "not suffice" to establish "some evidence. '561 "The substance
'5 62
of the [expert's] testimony must be considered.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court recognized that "[i]t
[can] be argued that looking beyond the testimony [of the expert] to determine the reliability of scientific evidence is incompatible with our no
evidence standard of review. '563 That is, "[i]f a reviewing court is to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, . .. [the]
court should not look beyond the expert's testimony to determine if it is
reliable. '564 The Supreme Court rejected that argument on the basis that
it was "too simplistic. '565 Under this argument, the no evidence standard
of review is reduced "to a meaningless exercise of looking to see only
what words appear in the transcript of the testimony, not whether there is
in fact some evidence. ' 566 "[E]ven an expert with a degree," the Court
explained, "should not be able to testify that the world is flat, that the
moon is made of green cheese, or that the Earth is the center of the solar
system. "567
XVII.
A.

REMAND FOR

DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
NEW

TRIAL WHEN TRIAL COURT ERRS IN

FOLLOWING TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGE

In City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez,568 the Texas Supreme Court held
that, when a trial court submits an instruction in accordance with provisions of the Texas Pattern Jury Charge, any error in the instruction should
result in a remand of the case for a new trial, not in rendition of
56 9
judgment.
However, error in the jury charge does not necessarily warrant reversal. For instance, submission of an improper jury question is harmless
where an independent finding by the jury comports the same liability
upon the defendant. 570
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id. (emphasis added).
563. Id. at 712.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id. To determine reliability, the reviewing court must look at the numerous factors
set forth in Robinson and Daubert and the guidelines of TEX. R. EVID. 702. See id. Rule
702 "offers substantive guidelines in determining if the expert testimony is some evidence
of probative value." Id. In essence, the underlying data should be independently evaluated in determining if the opinion itself is reliable. See id. at 713.
568. 931 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
569. See id. at 536.
570. See Galveston County Fair & Rodeo, Inc. v. Glover, 940 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex.
1996) (per curiam).
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No REMAND TO COURT OF APPEALS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE

The Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether the
jury's verdict is supported by factually as well as legally sufficient evidence. 571 The Supreme Court can, however, remand a cause to the court
of appeals for a second factual sufficiency review. Of course, as the appellants in Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez572 discovered too
late, the Supreme Court cannot remand for a second factual sufficiency
573
review unless requested to do so by the petitioner.
C.

SUPREME COURT DISPOSITION OF MOTION FOR REHEARING:

TIMELINESS

In a harsh criticism of the Supreme Court's dilatoriness in ruling on
two motions for rehearing, Justice Cornyn called the three-year delay in
granting the motion for rehearing in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Simmons574 and the seven month delay in granting the motion for rehearing in Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis575 "unconscionable. '576 The de'577
lay, he said, "cannot be justified.
On November 4, 1997, Texas voters approved a constitutional amendment providing, in essence, that any motion for rehearing not acted on by
the Supreme Court before the 180th day after the date on which the motion was filed, is denied. 578 In Justice Cornyn's opinion, that such an
' 57 9
amendment is "necessary at all does not reflect well on this Court.
The Court, he said, "should have the self-discipline to timely dispose of
571. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1986).
572. 937 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996).
573. See id. at 455. The Supreme Court expressed concern over "the amount of nonprobative evidence cited by the court of appeals in determining that the jury's verdict was
supported by factually as well as legally sufficient evidence." Id. at 455. However, since
the petitioners did not ask the Court to remand the cause to the court of appeals for a
second factual sufficiency review, the Court had no choice but to affirm the court of appeals on that point. See id. at 455. The Supreme Court specifically noted that "Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 180 does not permit [the Court] to remand to the court of appeals
for another evidentiary review in the interest of justice." Id. See also TEX. R. App. P. 180
(stating:
In each cause, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals, or reverse and render such judgment as the court of appeals
should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court of appeals, or reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court, if it shall appear
that the justice of the cause demands another trial.
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, under the new rules of appellate procedure, the Supreme
Court may only remand the case to the trial court in the interest of justice. See TEX. R.
App. P. 60.3 (effective Sept. 1, 1997).
574. No. D-4095, 1997 WL 378632 (Tex. July 9, 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 1998
WL 59210 (Tex. Feb. 13, 1998).
575. No. 94-1057, 1997 WL 378632 (Tex. July 9, 1997).
576. 1997 WL 378632 at *3.
577. Id.
578. The new constitutional amendment provides, "Notwithstanding Section 1, Article
II, of this constitution and any other provision of this constitution, if the supreme court
does not act on a motion for rehearing before the 180th day after the date on which the
motion is filed, the motion is denied." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(d).
579. State Farm, 1997 WL 378632, at *3.
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58s0

REQUEST THAT COURT OF APPEALS VACATE OR SET ASIDE

. TRIAL

COURT'S JUDGMENT

581
As recognized by the Waco Court of Appeals in Rothlander v. Ayala,
former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 80(b) did "not permit the
courts of appeals to 'vacate' or 'set aside' a judgment of the trial

court.

'582

Because of this limitation in the rules, the Waco court inter-

preted a party's request to vacate and set aside a judgment "as a request
that [the court] reverse the judgment of the trial court. '5 83 New Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(e) expressly provides that the court of
appeals may "vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case. '584
XVIII. MOTION FOR REHEARING
In Stangel v. Parker,5 85 the Supreme Court granted the petitioner relief
from an order of the court of appeals denying his motion for an extension
of time to file his motion for rehearing in the court of appeals. 586 The
Court found that the motion for extension complied with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 100(g), 587 as it was timely

filed and it reasonably explained the need for more time, i.e, that petitioner needed time to retrieve his file from his former counsel and to
obtain a new lawyer. 588 Under such circumstances, the denial by the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals of the motion for extension for no stated reason
589
constituted an abuse of discretion.
In Hansen v. Academy Corporation,590 the First District Court of Appeals effectively overruled its denial of an appellee's motion for rehearing
in a first appeal while reviewing a second appeal from the same case. In
Hansen, the Academy Corporation (Academy) brought a declaratory
judgment action to resolve who owed taxes on property leased by Acad580. Id.

581. 943 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ granted) (per curiam).
582. Id. at 546; see also TEX. R. App. P. 80(b) (amended). Rule 80(b) stated:

The court of appeals may: (1) affirm the judgment of the court below, (2)
modify the judgment of the court below by correcting or reforming it, (3)
reverse the judgment of the court below and dismiss the case or render the
judgment or decree that the court below should have rendered, or (4) reverse
the judgment of the court below and remand the case for further
proceedings.

Id.
583. See Rothlander, 943 S.W.2d at 546.
584. TEX. R. App. P. 43.2(e) (effective Sept. 1, 1997).
585. 945 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
586. See id. at 114.
587. See TEX. R. App. P. 100(g). Rule 100(g) states, in pertinent part, that "An extension of time may be granted for late filing in a court of appeals of a motion ... for rehearing, if a motion reasonably explaining the need therefor is filed with the court of appeals
not later than fifteen days after the last date for filing the motion."
588. See Stangel, 945 S.W.2d at 114-15.
589. See id.
590. 961 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
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emy.591 Hansen filed a counterclaim against Academy for breach of the
lease agreement and alternatively pled intentional trespass, claiming that
Academy used a small building and sign on the premises without Hansen's permission. 592 The trial court found that Academy was to pay the
593
property taxes under the lease agreement.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment
finding that Academy leased only the building with rights to use the parking lot. 594 As a result, Hansen, not Academy, was required to pay property taxes on the parking lot and the surrounding land. 5 95 The court
remanded the case for the limited purpose of determining the amount of
taxes owed on the building and the amount of attorney fees to be
596
awarded under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Hansen subsequently filed a motion for rehearing, urging the court of
appeals to remand his trespass claim in light of its decision that Academy
had leased only the building rather than the entire premises. 597 The court
denied the motion for rehearing without opinion. 5 98 Hansen nonetheless
urged the trial court to consider his trespass claim. 599 The trial court refused to do So.600
Hansen filed a second appeal after remand, arguing that the trial court
60 1
erred in not allowing Hansen to pursue his trespass claim on remand.
The court of appeals found that the trial court's authority on remand
"was limited by the mandate to determine the actual amount of taxes to
be reimbursed to Hansen by Academy [for taxes on the building], and to
ascertain reasonable attorney fees [for Academy]". 60 2 As a result, the
trial court did not err in refusing to hear Hansen's trespass claim. 60 3 Despite finding that the trial court had no authority to hear Hansen's trespass claim, however, the court decided to reconsider its original opinion
in light of Hansen's continued assertion of his right to pursue his trespass
claim. 60 4 The court of appeals effectively used the auspices of a second
appeal to reconsider its decision in the first appeal after mandate had
issued. While the ultimate outcome of the second appeal may have been
the just result, the procedural authority for the court's reconsideration of
its original opinion is curious.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 333.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 334.

598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 335.
id.
id.
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XIX. APPELLATE ATTORNEYS' FEES
In Cain v. Pruett,60 5 a deceptive trade practices case, the jury awarded
the plaintiff nothing for appellate attorney's fees, and the plaintiff moved
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on that issue. 60 6 Despite the
fact that plaintiff's counsel had testified at trial that the total sum of
$15,000 would be a reasonable fee for all appeals, the trial court granted
the motion for judgment n.o.v. and entered an amended judgment awarding $50,000 in appellate attorney's fees.60 7 At oral argument, counsel
stated to the court of appeals that the $50,000 award of appellate attorney's fees was a clerical error. 60 8 The court of appeals reversed the award
of $50,000 in appellate attorney fees and entered judgment in accordance
with the jury's zero finding, holding that "the evidence did not conclusively establish" that "any certain amount" of appellate attorney's fees
was reasonable and that the jury could have concluded that appellate attorney's fees was included in the contingency fee arrangement between
60 9
plaintiff and his counsel.
XX.

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

In Awde v. Dabeit,6 10 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
"whether a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following a
[county court's] dismissal for want of prosecution and the imposition of
sanctions extends the time for perfecting appeal."' 611 The Court held that,
while it "does not ordinarily have jurisdiction in cases in which a county
court has original or appellate jurisdiction," 6 12 the Court had jurisdiction
because the case involved the construction of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 41(a)(1). 613 Citing its decision in Del Valle Independent School
Districtv. Lopez, 6 14 the Supreme Court found that it also had jurisdiction
to determine whether the court of appeals, which had dismissed the ap61 5
peal for want of jurisdiction, itself had jurisdiction.

605. 938 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
606. See id. at 159.
607. See id. at 159-60.
608. See id. at 159.
609. Id. at 160.
610. 938 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1997).
611. Id. at 32.
612. Id. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1998). Section
22.225(b)(1) states, in pertinent part, that
Except as provided by Subsection (c), a judgment of a court of appeals is
conclusive on the law and facts, and a writ of error is not allowed from the
supreme court, in the following civil cases:
(1) a case appealed from a county court or from a district court when,
under the constitution, a county court would have had original or appellate
jurisdiction of the case ....

Id.
613. See TEX. R. App. P. 41(A)(1).
614. 845 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1992).
615. See Awde, 938 S.W.2d at 32.

